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The American Advantage in Civil Procedure?
An Autopsy of the Deutsche Telekom Litigation
MICHAEL HALBERSTAM
This Article examines the influence of civil procedure on the legal
framework that supports securities markets in the United States and in
Germany. It does so by way of comparing parallel shareholder actions
against Deutsche Telekom for securities disclosure violations arising out
of the same facts and allegations-the first set of actions filed in federal
district court in Manhattan, the second filed in district court in Frankfurt,
Germany. Deutsche Telekom was accused in both actions of
misrepresenting the value of its real estate holdings in its financial
disclosures and for failing to disclose negotiations for the acquisition of
the U.S. company VoiceStream in its July 2000 offering.
But the cases proceeded very differently and produced dramatically
different outcomes. Within five years, and after full discovery, the U.S.
class action plaintiffs negotiated a $120 million settlement with the
Deutsche Telekom defendants. Meanwhile, the parallel claims by German
shareholders, the first of which were filed in 2001, were ultimately
dismissed by the German courts in 2012, despite Germany's 2004 adoption
of a new and unprecedented aggregate litigation mechanism (dubbed "the
Deutsche Telekom law") to afford thousands of complaining German
shareholders a reasonable mechanism for pursuing a just and speedier
resolution of their claims. Finally, in 2014, the German Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof) ruled in favor ofplaintiffs on a separate claim, but, to
date, German shareholders still have not received any monetary damages.
Building on prior research (with lrica Gorga) about the importance of
litigation discovery for U.S. corporate and securities laws, this Article
examines how German civil procedure gets in the way of private
enforcement.
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The American Advantage in Civil Procedure?
An Autopsy of the Deutsche Telekom Litigation
IiCHAEL HALBERSTAM
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the influence of civil procedure on the legal
framework that supports securities markets in the United States and
Germany-two very different legal systems. It does so by way of
comparing parallel shareholder actions against Deutsche Telekom for
securities disclosure violations arising out of the same facts and
allegations-the first set of actions filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York,' the second set of actions filed in district
court in Frankfurt, Germany.2
Deutsche Telekom was accused in both the U.S. and German actions
of misrepresenting the value of its real estate holdings in its financial
disclosures and for failing to disclose negotiations for the acquisition of the
U.S. company VoiceStream in its June 2000 global offering. 3 DT's stock
price declined substantially after news of the fifty billion Euro
VoiceStream acquisition hit the markets, and again, in February of 2001,
after the company took a two billion Euro write-down for a decline in its
real estate assets.4 Shareholders in the United States and in Germany filed
suit, claiming that the company had violated its securities disclosure
obligations. 5
But the cases proceeded very differently and produced dramatically
different outcomes. U.S. class action plaintiffs filed suit in the Southern
* Michael Halberstam is Associate Professor of Law at the State University of New York Law
School, at Buffalo, New York. The author wishes to thank Guyora Binder, Kate Brown, Urs Peter
Gruber, Daniel Klerman, Susan Mangold, John Schlegel, Ralph Stone, Klaus Rotter, Mathias Siems,
Andreas Tilp, Robert Wallner, James A. Wooten, and the members of the SUNY Buffalo Faculty
Workshop for discussing the ideas set forth in this Article. My special thanks to Guyora Binder and
Kate Brown for their close readings of various drafts and for their important suggestions.
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., 229 F.
Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 00-CV-9475).
2 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt a.M. [OLG Frankfurt] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt] May 16,
2012, 23 Kap 1/06, Neue Zeitschrift fr Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 747, 2012.
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, Jf 2, 26, 29, 31, 33, 35-36, 42,
44.
5 Id.
District of New York in December of 2000.6 After full discovery, plaintiffs
negotiated a $120 million settlement with the Deutsche Telekom
defendants.7 The settlement was approved by the court in June of 2005.
Meanwhile, the parallel claims by German shareholders, the first of which
were filed in 2001,9 were ultimately dismissed by the German courts in
2012,'o despite Germany's late-2004 adoption of a new and unprecedented
aggregate litigation mechanism (dubbed "the Deutsche Telekom law") to
afford thousands of complaining German shareholders a reasonable
mechanism for pursuing a just and speedier resolution of their claims."
The case was appealed to the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshofl),
which published its decision on October 12, 2014, affirming the Higher
Regional Court's judgment on the VoiceStream and real estate allegations,
but finding fault with the by now fourteen-year-old lawsuit on grounds that
the prospectus illegally classified certain transactions with a subsidiary
involving Sprint shares as sales1 2-an issue that was neither complained of
nor litigated in New York. As of the publication date of this Article,
German shareholders have not received any monetary damages, due to
further proceedings in the Frankfurt District Court.
The different developments of these parallel actions speak to the
debate about the private enforcement of capital markets regulation in the
United States and Europe.13
6 Id.
' In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., No. 00-CV-9475 (NRB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45798, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2005).
' Id. at * 1.
' Andreas W. Tilp & Thomas A. Roth, The German Capital Market Model Proceedings Act as
Illustrated by the Example of the Frankfurt Deutsche Telekom Claims, in MASS TORTS IN EUROPE 131,
134 (Willem H. van Boom & Gerhard Wagner eds., 2014).
" Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt a.M. [OLG Frankfurt] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt] May 16,
2012, 23 Kap 1/06, Neue Zeitschrift tir Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 747, 2012.
" See Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets Model Case Act] Aug.
16, 2005, BGBI I at 243, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englisch-kapmug/index.htnl
[https://perma.cc/7BYT-HY6G]. See generally KOLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM KAPMUG (Burkhard Hess
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter KOLNER KOMMENTAR] (providing law text and academic
commentary).
12 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Oct. 21, 2014, XI ZB 12/12,
http://juris.bundesgerichtshofde/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht-bgh&Art-pm&Datum=
2014&Sort-3&nr=69675&linked=hes&Blank-l &file=dokument.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS4G-ZZNA].
"3 For the U.S. debate, see, for example, Brief of Amici Curiae State of Oregon et al. at 5,
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-217), 2014 WL 526438, at *5
(arguing to preserve "fraud on the market" doctrine in light of the importance of private enforcement
and citing literature); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, I 10
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 351 (2010) ("[B]oth legal systems could meet at some intermediate point in the
not too distant future."); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 708-709 (2009); James D. Cox & Randall S.
Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of
the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REv. 164 (2009); 1rica Gorga
& Michael Halberstam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate Governance: The Missing Story About
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U.S. regulations have become the template for securities market
regulation in Europe, Latin America, and Asia.1 4  Many European
"The Genius of American Corporate Law", 63 EMORY L.J. 1383, 1386-89 (2014) (discussing
literature); Stephen J. Choi & Adam Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities Class Actions: An
Empirical Comparison (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-022, 2014),
http://ssm.com/abstract-2109739 [https://perma.cc/4QNM-8VDY]. In addition, see generally James J.
Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115,
120 (2012) (arguing in support of decentralized securities enforcement); Steven A. Ramirez, The
Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOYOLA U.
CHI. L.J. 669, 674 (2014) ("[Plrivate securities litigation operates as a key bulwark for securing
investor confidence and thus financial stability."); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation
Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule IOb-5, 108
COLUM. L. REv. 1301, 1303-04 (2008); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities
Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010) [hereinafter Rose,
Multienforcer Approach] (arguing for centralization of the securities enforcement process); Matthew C.
Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of
Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 95 (2005) ("[Tjhe executive branch should have
substantially more control over the existence and scope of private enforcement actions . . . ."); Jonathan
Karpoff et al., The Legal Penalties for Financial Misrepresentation 2-3 (May 1, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-933333 [https://perma.cc/WD9V-8ELA] (providing empirical
study of all 697 enforcement actions initiated by the SEC for financial misrepresentation from 1978
through 2004 and comparing penalties from resulting private class action awards).
For the European debate, see, for example, Paolo Giudici, Representative Litigation in Italian
Capital Markets: Italian Derivative Suits and (if Ever) Securities Class Actions, 6 EUR. COMPANY &
FIN. L. REV. 246, 254 (2009) ("Italian law does not grant any inspection right to shareholders of public
companies."). In addition, see generally CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE
REDRESS IN EUROPE 78ff(2008); KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note i1, at 39-47 (reviewing literature);
PROSPEKT- UND KAPITALMARKTINFORMATIONSHAFTUNG: RECHT UND REFORM IN DER EUROPAISCHEN
UNION, DER SCHWEIZ UND DEN USA (K.J. Hopt & H.C. Voigt eds., 2005); Klaus Rotter, Der
Referentenentwurf des BMI zum KapMuG-Ein Schritt in die Richtige Richtung!, 12 VERBRAUCHER
UND RECHT 443 (2011).
For the European debate about the introduction of class action mechanisms, see generally THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS ACTIONS IN EUROPE (Juergen G. Backhaus et al. eds., 2012); AUF
DEM WEG ZU EINER EUROPAISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE? (Mattias Casper et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter
EUROPAISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE].
For the comparative debate, see KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note I1, at 39-47 (reviewing
literature); Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement:
The Parmalat Case, in AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES
REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE US 159 (John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2006); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 230 (2007)
(arguing that "higher enforcement intensity gives the U.S. economy a lower cost of capital and higher
securities valuations"); Eberhard Feess & Axel Halfineier, The German Capital Markets Model Case
Act (KapMuG): A European Role Model for Increasing the Efficiency of Capital Markets? Analysis
and Suggestions for Reform, 20 EUR. J. FIN. 361 (2014); Gorga & Halberstam, supra, at 1479-92
(comparing enforcement and discovery between the United States, Brazil, and Europe); Howell E.
Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential
Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2007) (arguing that the United States expends substantially
more resources on public and private securities enforcement than other nations).
14 CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE
CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 17-20
(2008); MATTIAS SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 126 (2008) ("US Securities law today
has a model effect that justifies talk of not so much approximation of various legal systems as
8212016]1
countries, including Germany, have adopted the U.S. securities disclosure
model and established regulatory agencies that include their own public
enforcement divisions." But recourse against issuers for securities
disclosure violations remains very limited-especially for the kinds of
retail investors who were courted by the Deutsche Telekom offerings.16
Europeans have recognized that the nature of such claims requires some
kind of class action or aggregate litigation mechanism. 17 In the consumer
protection context, many European countries have consequently
implemented litigation mechanisms that aggregate claims or allow for
some kind of representative litigation,' 8 but the resistance to exporting
U.S.-style class actions to Europe is universal. 19
By way of a case study, this Article examines how and why private
enforcement of securities laws in Europe appears to fail, even after
investor-friendly substantive and procedural law changes.
alignment on American standards from the 1933 and 1934 Act, the SEC Rules, and the NYSE
manual."); see also Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1386-89 (discussing the corporate
governance debate).
" See, for example, the European Union's adoption of the Transparency for Listed Companies
Directive ("Transparency Directive"), 2004/109/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38, as amended in Directive
2013/50/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 13, to improve the uniformity of securities disclosure requirements for
issuers whose securities are listed on stock exchanges within the European Union. Like other countries,
Germany has passed legislation to implement the Transparency Directive. See Transparenzlinien-
Umsetzungsgesetz [[UG] [Transparency Directive Implementation Act] Jan. 5, 2007, BGBI I at 10.
6 Feess & Halfineier, supra note 13, at 361 ("Compared with the USA and other countries with
collective procedures in capital markets cases, it is notoriously difficult for small investors in most
European countries to get damages for losses caused by wrong or omitted capital markets
information."); see also Andreas W. Tilp, Dos Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz: Stresstestfuer
den Telekom-Prozess, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR AcHtM KRAMER ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAGE 331 (Uwe
Blaurock et al. eds., 2009); Timo Holzbom & Martin Eberhard Foelsch, Schadenersatzpflichten von
Aktiengesellschafien und Deren Management bei Anlegerverlusten--Ein Oberblick, 56 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 932 (2003).
" Feess & Halfneier, supra note 13, at 361; Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across
the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1, 3 (2009) (finding that
European countries have "come to embrace civil procedure reforms to authorize aggregate litigation").
See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?,
62 VAND. L. REv. 179 (2009) (discussing the repercussions of deregulation across Europe); Gerhard
Wagner, Collective Redress-Categories of Loss and Legislative Options, 127 LAW Q. REv. 55 (2011).
18 HODGES, supra note 13, at 9-13.
19 HODGES, supra note 13, at 131 ("There is a widely quoted mantra in European policy
documents that collective mechanisms within the litigation system in the United States operate badly,
produce unacceptable results and should not be emulated in Europe."); see also Nagareda, supra note
17, at 6; Andrd Janssen, Auf dem Weg zu Einer Europdischen Sammelklage?, in EUROPAISCHEN
SAMMELKLAGE, supra note 13, at 3, 4-5. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State
Discovery, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369 (2013) (examining the assumptions about state authority that
underly U.S.-style class actions).
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According to Plaintiffs' attorneys, one major factor in the Deutsche
Telekom case was the lack of discovery.20 In German civil actions,
plaintiffs have a very hard time investigating company internal
wrongdoing, because of fundamental principles of civil law adjudication
that are deeply embedded in German civil procedure.21 Party-on-party
discovery is prohibited.2 2 There are no interrogatories,2 3 no pretrial witness
depositions,24 and no document discovery.25 For the most part, parties must
obtain documentary evidence in support of their claims independently and
extrajudicially.2 6 Defendants are not required, and cannot be forced, to
produce relevant documents or electronic discovery to support a plaintiffs
case.2 7 Based on these principles, as well as other principles of due process,
the German court (and the U.S. court, acting on principles of comity upon
receiving a letter from the German government2 8) refused to allow German
plaintiffs in the Deutsche Telekom litigation access to discovery materials
that had already been produced in the U.S. litigation. 29 German plaintiffs
sought to obtain the documents and deposition transcripts pertinent to their
case 30 in U.S. proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1782,31 and the German
government went so far as to vehemently object to such disclosure.3 2
' Bad Connection: A Class Action of Sorts for Germany's Disillusioned Shareholders,
EcoNOMIST (Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/ 1021139 [https://perma.cc/SZA8-
GER5] [hereinafter Bad Connection].
21 See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1483-85, 1488-90.
22 See PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 595 (2004) ("There is no
discovery as such.").
' See Kurt Riechenberg, The Recognition of Foreign Privileges in United States Discovery
Proceedings, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 80, 88 (1988) ("[U]nder the German Code of Civil Procedure,
(which has no counterpart to United States pre-trial discovery), parties are not under an unqualified
obligation to answer interrogatories . . . .").
24 See MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 241 ("In Germany, there is ordinarily no oral
examination of witnesses during the preparatory phases of the proceeding; if a witness is examined, it is
always the judge who conducts the questioning.").
25 See CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 223 (Oscar G. Chase et al. eds., 2007)
(noting that even though the 2001 reform of Germany's code of civil procedure introduced a new
procedural right to documentary disclosure, procedural orders are not directly enforceable). "While
parties and their lawyers can and do conduct their own fact investigations during the case preparation
phase, the lack of discovery tools . .. discourage[s] such activities." MURRAY & STORNER, supra note
22, at 595 ("There is no discovery as such."); see also CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT,
supra, at 207-40 (comparing the discovery mechanisms in England, the United States, Germany, and
Japan).
26 CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT, supra note 25, at 223 ("Since the parties do not
have a general procedural right to obtain the relevant information, they have to rely on their personal
knowledge and on the material in their possession.").
' The basic privilege of a party not to disclose evidence against its own interest, or to open itself
up to searching discovery, remains in place in Germany. R.R. VERKERK, FACT-FINDING IN CIVIL
LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16 (2010).
' Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebbard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 81-82, 85 (2d Cir. 2004).
2 9 Id at 82.
0 Id. at 81.
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This Article thus considers claims about the importance of litigation
discovery for corporate and securities laws advanced in previous research
(with Erica Gorga) about the importance of litigation discovery for U.S.
corporate and securities laws in an article entitled Litigation Discovery and
Corporate Governance: The Missing Story About "The Genius of
American Corporate Law ".3 There we argued that modem litigation
discovery has had a profound impact on the evolution of shareholder
litigation, corporate governance, and the culture of corporate disclosure in
the United States. We showed how litigation discovery in the United States
has driven and structured the process of corporate shareholder litigation;34
persistently generated information that stimulated the development of case
law defining shareholder rights and fiduciary duties;" induced incremental
improvements in corporate governance practices, including more exacting
decision procedures, internal monitoring, record-keeping, and disclosure; 36
established templates for independent corporate internal investigations by
boards and regulators; 37 and given regulators steady insight into changing
corporate internal practices and patterns of wrongdoing.3 8
This Article explores the corollary to these claims. Does the lack of
adequate tools for fact investigation in private litigation in Europe (and
other civil law jurisdictions) compromise the enforcement of shareholder
rights-even in sophisticated jurisdictions like Germany, which Professor
John Langbein famously advocated as a model of efficient fact-finding in
his controversial article, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure?39 If
so, the German (and European) procedural law would appear unable to
support the kind of issuer transparency that European lawmakers have been
pursuing. 40
This Article pursues these comparative questions at a very concrete
level, by way of comparing two parallel cases.
31 This section of the U.S. Code allows a district court to order a person to produce a document or
other thing for use in a foreign proceeding or international tribunal. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2012).
32 Schmitz, 376 F.3d at 84 ("The German authorities expressed concerns that granting discovery
would. . . 'jeopardize German sovereign rights.').
33 Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13.
34 Id at 1420-25.
3 Id. at 1455-61.
6 Id. at 1453-54.
" Id. at 1444-53.
38 Id. at 1479.
" John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 824
(1985).
' See, e.g., Dirk A. Verse, Liability for Incorrect Capital Market Information, in GERMAN
NATIONAL REPORTS ON THE 19TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 415, 416
(Martin Schmidt-Kessel ed., 2014) (discussing the European Transparency Directive). See generally
HEINZ-DIETER AsSMANN & ROLF A. SCHOTZE, HANDBUCH DES KAPITALANLAGERECHTS (3d rev. ed.
2007).
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Part II of this Article describes how concerns about discovery abuse
shape the debate about the private enforcement of securities laws in the
United States and in Europe. It suggests that European civil law systems,
like Germany, cannot promote private enforcement without affording
plaintiffs more robust tools of fact investigation. And it explains how the
Deutsche Telekom case speaks directly to this debate.
Part III begins by explaining the special significance of the Deutsche
Telekom case for the development of the German securities markets. It
describes the events that led plaintiffs in both the United States and
Germany to file suit and details the factual allegations and legal claims in
the U.S. and German complaints.
Part IV compares the development of the litigation in the United States
and in Germany. It describes the dramatically different progress of the
German and the U.S. cases, the German plaintiffs' attempt to obtain
discovery from the United States, the collapse of the German court system
in light of the large number of claims, and how a new aggregate litigation
mechanism passed by the German parliament in response to this situation
shaped the further development of the litigation.
Part V considers the differences in substantive laws and legal standards
applied in the United States and in Germany and how they might have
influenced the outcome of the litigation.
Part VI examines what inferences we can make about the relative
effectiveness of U.S. and German civil procedure from what we have
learned. It considers whether the KapMuG statute makes aggregate
securities litigation more efficient, whether it gives plaintiffs a fair chance
at building their case, and how the comparison reflects back on criticisms
of securities class actions in the United States. In so doing, it also
acknowledges the difficulties of coming to conclusions about the operation
and effects of different civil procedure mechanisms, especially during a
time when those mechanisms are undergoing significant changes.
Part VII concludes.
H. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT: WHOSE ADVANTAGE?
On both sides of the Atlantic, there has been an ongoing debate about
the proper relationship between the public and private enforcement of
securities laws.4 1
In the United States, the debate has largely been about how much to
rein in securities class actions without undermining their deterrent
function.4 2 Congress and the Supreme Court have repeatedly acted to
41 See sources cited supra note 13.
42 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) ("[The Supreme
Court] has long recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws
2016] 825
curtail securities class actions over the past decades, while encouraging
greater reliance on public enforcement 43-especially in the wake of the
2002 Enron and WorldCom scandals." And several scholars who have
questioned the current mix of public and private enforcement go so far as
to suggest that an exclusive public enforcement model should be
considered.4 5
In contrast, the European debate has been about how far to go in
private enforcement mechanisms-like aggregate or representative suits-
to achieve a speedier resolution of investor claims without opening the
door to U.S.-style class actions." Currently, the civil procedure of many
E.U. member states is developing mechanisms of aggregate litigation.47
Policymakers at the E.U. level and in member states recognize that
relatively small injuries distributed across a large number of individuals-
like consumer product defects, antitrust violations, and securities
disclosure violations-cannot be adequately addressed by the courts
without special litigation procedures. 48 As we shall see, Deutsche Telekom
stands for this proposition in German jurisprudence. At the E.U. level, this
recognition is reflected in the E.U. "Transparency Directives" for
are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought,
respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Private
securities fraud actions, however, if not adequately contained, can be employed abusively to impose
substantial costs on companies and individuals whose conduct conforms to the law." (citations
omitted)). See generally Laura A. McDonald, Restoring the Balance After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 911 (2011) (reviewing the debate and relevant
policy changes since the 1970s).
4 See generally Carl W. Hittinger & Jarod M. Bona, The Diminishing Role of the Private
Attorney General in Antitrust and Securities Class Action Cases Aided by the Supreme Court, 4 J. Bus.
& TECH. L. 167 (2009) (discussing Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-AtIlanta Inc., where the
Supreme Court followed the "recent perceived pattern" in securities and antitrust cases to restrict
private enforcement mechanisms like class action lawsuits).
4 DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS
665 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that the SEC's congressional appropriations have tripled since 2002, from
$439 million to $1.2 billion in the fiscal year 2012).
4 See, e.g., Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 13, at 2176 (suggesting that the SEC
should be granted "exclusive authority to prosecute national securities frauds").
' See supra text accompanying notes 14-19 (noting that while Europe, Latin America, and Asia
have recognized that the nature of claims against issuers for securities disclosure violations requires
some kind of aggregate litigation mechanism, they have resisted the U.S.-style class action, although
many have still implemented aggregate litigation mechanisms in the consumer protection context); see
also KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 20, 56 (discussing the need for collective redress
mechanisms).
4 See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 17, at 20-25 (cataloguing the development of aggregate
litigation mechanisms in Europe). See generally HODGES, supra note 13 (examining mechanisms for
collective redress in Europe).
4 See, e.g., HODGES, supra note 13, at I (noting that collective redress mechanisms are a "hot
topic" in Europe); KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at I (defining the scope of Germany's
KapMuG legislation); Roswitha Moller-Piepenkotter, Geleitwort, in EUROPAISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE,
supra note 13, at Xl (citing developments at the E.U. level).
826 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:817
THE AMERICAN ADVANTAGE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE?
improving and establishing uniform standards for public company
disclosure. 4 9 The Transparency Directive, inter alia, calls for the member
states to adopt aggregate litigation mechanisms, but its legislative history
explicitly disclaims the U.S. class action model.o
Even as some European countries, like Germany, have passed
legislation to do so, public enforcement remains the near exclusive venue
for punishing and deterring issuer misconduct.51 In these debates, the costs
of U.S.-style class actions, and in particular of litigation discovery, loom
large. 52
The ability of U.S. plaintiffs to impose substantial discovery costs and
burdens on corporate defendants is often viewed as a critical component of
successfully prosecuting securities class actions.53 At the same time, the
U.S. retreat from the "private attorney general" model in securities
litigation is closely linked with the controversial theory that so-called
"impositional discovery" enables plaintiff-side attorneys to pressure
defendants to settle based on the threat of discovery rather than the merits
of the case.54 Apart from encouraging meritless (and therefore unjust)
strike suits, the critics of securities class actions maintain that the costs and
burdens of discovery generate over-deterrence. Limiting plaintiffs' ability
to obtain discovery has thus been the principal point of leverage for U.S.
reforms.56
Even as Europeans introduce aggregate litigation mechanisms into
their domestic law, their reactions to litigation discovery in the U.S. class
action setting are extreme. Discovery's purported excesses are viewed with
nothing short of horror-the equivalent of "boiling the ocean to heat a tea
" See Directive 2004/109/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38, amended by Directive 2013/50/EU, 2013
O.J. (L 294) 13.
' Andr6 Janssen, Auf dem Weg zu Einer Europaischen Sammelklage?, in EUROPAISCHEN
SAMMELKLAGE, supra note 13, at 3, 3.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 4.
" See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1476 & n.490; Bad Connection, supra note 20
(stating that given the lack of adequate discovery in European securities actions, "we are at a great
disadvantage" as compared with the U.S.).
' See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007); Michael J.
Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access Barriers to Remedies for Securities Fraud, 75
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 75-76 (2012) (discussing the thesis that plaintiffs can force defendants to
settle because of the costs of discovery rather than the strength of the merits of their case); JOHN H.
BEISNER, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE CENTRE CANNOT HOLD: THE NEED FOR
EFFECTIVE REFORM OF THE U.S. CiviL DISCOVERY PROCESS 1-2 (2010), http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/uploads/sites/1/ilr discovery 2010 0.pdf [https://perma.cc/567i-FUYQ] (aggressively
promoting discovery reform on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
s Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 54, at 76.
' Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes
During the First Decade Afier the PSLRA, 106 COLUM, L. REv. 1489, 1492, 1529 (2006); McDonald,
supra note 42, at 911-12.
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kettle" in the words of one observer. Following Langbein, U.S. litigation
discovery is considered to be an extremely inefficient way to acquire
evidence for the resolution of civil disputes." The rise of electronic
discovery has only heightened the sense that Americans are "nuts" when it
comes to the scope and tools of litigation discovery, and the resources that
are allocated to discovery.59
The costs and burdens of litigation discovery are thus at the heart of
the debate about how to find the right balance between public and private
enforcement in the United States and in Europe. As already mentioned, this
debate is longstanding.
In his 1983 article, Langbein championed the efficiency of German
civil procedure. He argued that the German civil law process of evidence
acquisition and fact-finding by a judge is far superior to the long and
wasteful U.S. process of litigation discovery. 60
In civil law systems, like Germany, judges have a much more active
role in civil litigation than U.S. trial court judges do.6 ' There is no jury.62
The judge is the one who resolves all issues of law and fact. The judge
identifies the issues, investigates the facts, hears all the evidence, and
proceeds issue by issue looking for the fastest way to resolve the dispute.'
The system is "inquisitorial" in the sense that the judge is always active
and drives the proceedings.65 Proceedings are "episodic" in that there is no
single trial. 6
According to Langbein this inquisitorial approach is far superior,
because the judge is able to focus the fact investigation based on the legal
issues as they come up.6 And at each stage of the proceedings only
evidence relevant to the particular issue at hand is considered. New
evidence may be introduced at any time, which avoids the need to engage
s Interview with Klaus Rotter, named partner of Rotter Rechtsanwalte, in Munich, Ger. (Oct. 7,
2014).
" Langbein, supra note 39, at 823-24.
'9 See Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REv.
299, 311-12 (2002).
* Langbein, supra note 39, at 824.
61 See MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 11.
62 Langbein, supra note 39, at 848.
63 MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 11.
' Langbein, supra note 39, at 830 ("In German procedure the court ranges over the entire case,
constantly looking for the jugular-for the issue of law or fact that might dispose of the case.").
6 See id. However, while judges drive fact-gathering, Germany's civil procedure is far from non-
adversarial. See id at 841 ("Outside the realm of fact-gathering, German civil procedure is about as
adversarial as our own.").
6 See id. at 830; cf MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 14 (characterizing German civil
proceedings as "continuous"). But there is an increasing tendency to consolidate hearings. Id.
6' Langbein, supra note 39, at 830.
6 Id.
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in useless fact investigation.69 Much of the work is done via written
submissions by the parties.70 The written depositions recount and interpret
the facts for the judge prior to the hearing. The judge will have reviewed
the written submissions prior to the hearing and thus is able to focus
discussion on questions left unanswered by the submissions.'
Langbein argued that U.S. discovery has turned into an adversarial
process in which the parties seek to impose unnecessary costs on one
another, but also withhold evidence and make accurate fact-finding less
likely.72 He cited excessive preparation of witnesses for depositions as a
prime example of the manipulation of evidence in the U.S. adversarial
system of party-on-party discovery. In contrast, he argued that there is no
such interference with witness testimony in the inquisitorial system.74 In
Germany, the judge interviews the witness directly and can focus the
interview on the issues at stake in the lawsuit, always looking to clarify
unanswered questions.7 5
Langbein further pointed out that litigators in the United States, who
are in control of discovery, have no incentive to limit time spent on
discovery, because their compensation is based on hourly fees.76 In
contrast, the German judge is focused on disposing of the case as
expediently as possible, because he has a full docket of other cases that
require his attention.77
Langbein concludes that German procedure is much less costly and
much more efficient than the U.S. system.78
Langbein's article was highly controversial. 79 And his interpretation of
German civil litigation law and practice has been challenged on a number
of important points.so Critics of Langbein have, for example, pointed out
that he limits his comparison to the "traditional bipolar lawsuit in contract,
tort, or entitlement" and explicitly excludes from the analysis the "Big
Case."8 1 But empirical evidence shows that it is in the big cases that
69 Id at 831.
70 Id at 829.
1 See id at 827-28 (stating that because the judge largely controls the direction of the trial, the
judge can focus on issues of particular relevance and importance that have not been resolved).
72 Id. at 841.
73 Id. at 833.
" Id. at 834.
7 MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 14-15.
76 See Langbein, supra note 39, at 829.
n See id. at 827.
71 Id at 866.
7 See Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details
and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 705, 707 (1988).
' Michael Bohlander, The German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View of German Civil
Procedure in the Nineties, 13 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 25, 28-29 (1998).
" Id. at 708 (citing Langbein, supra note 39, at 825).
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discovery generates substantial costs and extended discovery, whereas
many small cases are resolved with very limited discovery and a
significant percentage with no discovery at all. 82
It is in the so-called "Big Cases," where plaintiffs must obtain
evidence about wrongdoing by large corporations or government that U.S.
litigation discovery becomes a critical tool.83 In this vein, I have argued in
a previous paper (with Erica Gorga) that litigation discovery has had a
profound impact on the development of U.S. corporate and securities laws,
and, more broadly, on the U.S. culture of corporate transparency.8 In this
article, we describe in detail how litigation discovery shines a bright light
on corporate internal events and practices when it is allowed."
Depositions, document requests, interrogatories, the attorney subpoena
power, and third party discovery subject company internal operations,
business practices, decision procedures, and specific events to intense
scrutiny by outside gatekeepers and party-opponents.86 We show how the
tools and the reach of litigation discovery have become embedded in U.S.
practices of public and private enforcement, in corporate internal
governance and practices of communication and information management,
in the law of fiduciary duty, and in the expectations of market
participants.8 7 Contrary to popular views about the unaccountability of
corporate directors and officers, we conclude that U.S. corporations are
fairly transparent.'
But in Europe, there is no litigation discovery." There is no specific
phase of the litigation process dedicated to the exploration or collection of
evidentiary materials in civil law systems.90 Nor is there a general right to
obtain relevant information in connection with the proceedings.9' Party-on-
party discovery is not permitted and any demand for information from a
82 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTit, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 35 tbl.4, 38 tbl.6 (2009),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdfnsf/lookup/dissurvI.pdf/$file/dissurvl.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2RQ-
9JP9].
" See Allen et al., supra note 79, at 709 ("In the 'Big Case,' enormous time and resources are
invested in discovery, preparation and trial . . . .").
' Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1395.85 
id
6 Id. at 1398.
7 Id at 1394.
' An exception to the populist belief in corporate secrecy can be found in DON TAPSCOTT &
DAVID TICOLL, THE NAKED CORPORATION: How THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY WILL REVOLUTIONIZE
BUSINESS, at xii (2003). But Tapscott and Ticoll do not consider how the principles and practices of
litigation discovery have contributed to this result.
9 CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT, supra note 25, at 222.
9 Id.
9' See MURRAY & STURNER, supra note 22, at 277 (explaining that a party must file a request
with the judge to obtain inspection of documents and things from an opposing party, but that there is no
general right to obtain such information).
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defendant must be approved and issued by a judge. The parties are thus
expected to rely on their personal knowledge and any materials in their
possession to make out their case. While there are some substantive and
procedural rights to obtain information under certain circumstances-the
main procedural tool is a shifting of the burden of proof-these are
limited.92 A plaintiff must obtain evidence of corporate internal
wrongdoing from other sources, like investigative journalism, government
investigations, or whistleblowers. Plaintiff-side attorneys thus view
companies as "black boxes" which they are able to penetrate only under
special circumstances. German plaintiffs, like plaintiffs in other European
countries, 93 "practically have no access to . .. [an issuer's] files"-"[o]nly
prosecutors have the weapons to seize papers, question witnesses and find
out what actually happened." 94
But Langbein's view of U.S. civil litigation, and especially discovery,
appears still to be widely shared, especially in Europe. European
policymakers are thus, in a sense, attempting to square the circle. On the
one hand, they recognize the importance of aggregate litigation. On the
other, they are unwilling to afford plaintiffs the tools that are necessary to
investigate large public companies in a private enforcement proceeding. In
the words of Professor Richard Nagareda, "Europe consciously seeks to
avoid the U.S. experience," by attempting "to harness the closure potential
of aggregation, without its enabling potential."95
The debate about who has the advantage in civil procedure when it
comes to shareholder and securities litigation is therefore still very much
alive in the contemporary struggle to establish and maintain the legal
preconditions to strong securities markets. While the corporate governance
debate has in some ways moved on, policymakers are very much occupied
with this question at present.
9 See MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 268 ("[A]llocations of burden of proof often flow
from the considerations of relative accessibility and practicality of proof. . . .").
9 "Given the lack of efficient discovery rules, investor action against mass wrongdoings is
virtually impossible in Italy as it is in the rest of Europe, unless information is gathered by public
authorities." Ferrarini & Giudici, supra note 13, at 201 (citation omitted).
' Karin Matussek, Porsche Plaintifs Seek $5 Billion with Limited Tools, BLOOMBERG Bus. (June
26, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-)6-25/porsche-plaintiffs-seek-5-billion-with-
limited-tools [https://perma.cc/TWD7-H88D] ("Different from the U.S., plaintiffs here have no pre-
trial discovery, so they practically have no access to Porsche's files . . . . Only prosecutors have the
weapons to seize papers, question witnesses and find out what actually happened." (quoting law
professor Thomas Moellers)); Bad Connection, supra note 20 ("'Compared with America we are at a
great disadvantage,' says Andreas Tilp, whose law firm is spearheading the model trial on behalf of
shareholders. . . . Most aggravating for Mr. Tilp is his inability to secure documents, such as a Bonn
prosecutor's report that he believes concludes there was balance-sheet fraud, and another report from
the Federal Audit Court, which was pivotal in the American settlement."). A substantial portion of the
Bonn prosecutor's documents were finally obtained before the 2008 hearings by the plaintiffs.
" Nagareda, supra note 17, at 9.
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IHl. BACKGROUND AND COMPLAINTS
A. Background
The Deutsche Telekom case is of particular importance for
understanding the development of private enforcement of securities laws in
Germany. It was the largest German shareholder litigation ever.9 6 And it
involved share issuances that had a special significance for the German
securities markets as a whole.
The company resulted from the German government's decision to
privatize its telecommunications monopoly, which was part of the larger
government-run Deutsche Bundespost. Deutsche Telekom's 1996 Initial
Public Offering, which raised approximately $20 billion, was not just the
largest IPO in Europe ever-it represented a signal initiative to push
forward the German government's efforts to liberalize Germany's financial
markets and create a German shareholder culture. 9 7 During the 1990s,
German policymakers were rewriting German financial market regulations
to encourage greater investment in new technology startups, increase the
number of publicly held firms, create a market for firms, and, generally,
diversify away from the traditional, highly concentrated, German bank-
centered model of corporate finance towards a U.S. model of greater
reliance on the stock markets to capitalize firms.98 In this context, the
Deutsche Telekom IPO's success was of great importance.
Deutsche Telekom's IPO took place in 1996, the first secondary
offering was placed in 1999, and another offering followed in May/June
2000.9 The share offerings were advertised as a Volksaktie (the "people's
share"),1tu and both the privatization and offerings included unusual
features designed to encourage and sustain widespread share ownership.'o
Approximately forty percent of the 1996 share offering was allocated to
retail investors.102 Retail investors could purchase the shares at a
discount."o3 And the German government initially held onto seventy-four
percent, which could have been interpreted to mean that the government
* Tilp, supra note 16, at 332 (citing press reports).
" Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to
Shareholder Capitalism in Germany: Deutsche Telekom and DaimlerChrysler 2-4 (Columbia Law
Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 161, 2000), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstractid-208508 [https://perma.cc/464V-BMLG] ("One of the major recent objectives
of German economic policymakers has been the promotion of a shareholding culture among German
citizens.").
9 Id at 2-3.
" These offerings are referred to in the litigation as DTI, DT2, and DT3.
"O Tilp & Roth, supra note 9, at 132.
101 Gordon, supra note 97, at 15; Tilp & Roth, supra note 9, at 133.
" Gordon, supra note 97, at 13.
103 By contrast, the market places a premium on large blocks of shares.
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stood behind the company. Deutsche Telekom announced that it expected
to pay a two percent dividend in 1997 and a four percent dividend in 1998,
which Professor Jeffrey Gordon called "a somewhat remarkable
undertaking for a company in the midst of a fundamental business
change."l 04 Finally, the public landline telephone monopoly comprised a
substantial part of Deutsche Telekom's business. With a new government
regulatory agency setting the rates, "[a] prospective shareholder could well
find in these dividend arrangements an implicit promise that the
Regulatory Authority will set a rate structure so as to permit payment of a
regular dividend regardless of the profitability of Deutsche Telekom's
other business activities." 05
The litigation against Deutsche Telekom and its co-defendants in the
United States and Germany followed unscheduled disclosures by the
company in July of 2000 and in February of 2001.
On July 24, 2000, Deutsche Telekom disclosed that it was acquiring
the U.S. cellular and telecommunications company VoiceStream for
around fifty billion dollars.'06 The extraordinary price Deutsche Telekom
would pay to enter the highly competitive U.S. cellular market raised
serious concerns among investors. As a result, the company's share price
dropped by thirteen percent on the day of the VoiceStream
announcement.1 0 7 By December of 2000, shares had dropped by thirty
percent amid declining profits and a slump of European telecommunication
shares.'0o
The disclosure of the VoiceStream acquisition came only four weeks
after the company first listed its shares on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) on June 19, 2000, but was disclosed neither in the May 22
Registration Statement that it filed with the SEC, nor its June 17 U.S.
prospectus for the American Depositary Shares.1 09 Likewise, the May 2000
German offering and three supplements, the last of which was published in
June of 2000, contained no mention of the VoiceStream acquisition." 0
' Gordon, supra note 97, at 15.
1os Id. In order to reduce its ownership of Deutsche Telekom to below fifty percent, the German
government sold a large block of shares to the German Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW), the
public entity created to serve as a development bank for Eastern Germany after the collapse of the
GDR. KfW is the development bank that was created by the German government to help finance
economic development in the former East German territories.
" Nicole Harris et al., Deutsche Telekom Agrees to Acquire VoiceStream Wireless for $50.7
Billion, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2000), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB964424432543482052 [https://per
ma.cc/86D7-Q9MV].
" Vanessa Fuhrmans, German Firm Faces Suit over Offering-Deutsche Telekom Didn't Reveal
Plans, Lawyers Contend, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2000, at Al3.
log Id.
09 Id
.o See Tilp, supra note 16, at 338.
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The decision to acquire VoiceStream would cost Deutsche Telekom
dearly. In 2002, Deutsche Telekom wrote off around eighteen billion
dollars in assets relating to VoiceStream, contributing to a loss of $24.7
billion for the first nine months of 2002. The timing of the acquisition, at
the height of the dot-com bubble, was a major factor in this result.
In February of 2001, Deutsche Telekom issued another unscheduled
disclosure. The February disclosure announced the revaluation of Deutsche
Telekom's substantial real estate holdings in the amount of more than two
billion Euros (or $1.8 billion)."' The depreciation of the pretax value of its
real estate holdings would cut estimated net income in 2000 by 1.4 billion
Euros, revealing a fourth-quarter loss of 2.5 billion Euros.112
Deutsche Telekom's share price dropped again. On the Frankfurt stock
exchange, Deutsche Telekom's so-called T-Share (T-Aktie) was priced at
14.57 Euros in its initial 1996 European IPO. It reached a record 103
Euros, but then dropped back to around sixty Euros just before the third
stock issuance in June 2000.13
The valuation of Deutsche Telekom's real estate holdings had, by this
time, become the subject of a government investigation by a German
prosecutor in Bonn.1 4 The investigation, which was initiated on July 24,
2000, the same day on which Deutsche Telekom disclosed the
VoiceStream acquisition, followed disclosures in the press that Deutsche
Telekom had intentionally applied inappropriate valuation methods, going
back all the way to its 1996 public financial statements, and had
consequently overstated Deutsche Telekom's assets substantially."'
B. The U.S. Complaint
Deutsche Telekom shareholders who bought American Depository
Shares in the June 2000 offering filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York in December of 2000 against the company,
certain control persons, and its underwriters. The complaint named as
defendants (1) Deutsche Telekom, (2) its Chairman and CEO Ron
Sommer, who signed the Registration Statement; (3) the German public
" William Boston, Deutsche Telekom Cuts Net Estimates on Big Write-Down, WALL ST. J., Feb.
22, 200 1, at Al4.
112 Id
"' Deutsche Telekom AG, Annual Report for Fiscal Year Ending Dec. 31, 2000 (Form 20-F), at
100 (May 4, 2001).
11 Deutsche Telekom AG, Annual Report (Form 20-F/A), at 46 (Feb. 26, 2002).
"s William Boston, Deutsche Telekom 's Stance on Real Estate Is Disputed-Former Executive
Alleges Company Knew Figures Were Too High in 1995, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2001, at A14.
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development bank, KfW, which had owned the shares that were sold as
ADSs in the U.S. public offering; and (4) the underwriters.11 6
The Amended Class Action Complaint alleged that the May 22, 2000
Registration Statement and subsequent versions of the U.S. Offering were
materially false and misleading in that they (1) failed to disclose that
Deutsche Telekom was at that time engaged in advanced merger talks with
VoiceStream Wireless Corp., and (2) overstated Deutsche Telekom's real
estate portfolio by at least two billion Euros.1 7
Plaintiffs brought claims against all of the defendants under Sections
11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. The complaint charges
Deutsche Telekom's Chief Executive Officer, Ron Sommer, and KfW with
"control person liability" under Section 15 and 20 of the Securities Act for
Deutsche Telekom's violation of Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2)."' The
complaint also charges Deutsche Telekom, Ron Sommer, and KfW with
securities fraud pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
and Rule 1Ob-5 thereunder.' 19
Section 11 imposes strict liability on issuers for material misstatements
or omissions in a registration statement and provides for damages (not to
exceed in amount the price at which the securities were originally
offered).120 Directors, underwriters, and non-issuers charged under Section
11 have a "due diligence defense."12 1
Section 12(a)(2) overlaps with Section 11 in that it establishes a private
right of action for rescission against anyone who "offers or sells a security"
using a materially false or misleading prospectus (or oral
communication).1 2 2 "Like Section 11, Section 12(a)(2) waters down the
traditional elements of common law fraud." 23 Thus, under Section
12(a)(2), the plaintiff does not have to prove scienter, causation, or
reliance. Under 12(a)(2) defendants also have a defense of reasonable care,
or may avoid liability based on negative causation.1 24
"' Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, IT 9-16. These underwriters
included: Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Bank Alex. Brown Inc., Dresdner Kleinwort Benson North
America, Goldman Sachs & Co., and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.
"' Id. IT 27-29.
.. Id IT 23-24
119 Id. 1 3.
"0 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § I1, 48 Stat. 74, 82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(2012)).
121 Escott v. Barchriss Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
'" Securities Act of 1933 § 12(aX2) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 771(aX2) (2012)).
12 NAGY ET AL., supra note 44, at 308 (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Corp., 513 U.S. 561, 571, 581
(1995)).
124 Securities Act of 1933 § 12(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 771(2012)).
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Finally, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,' 25 and Rule 1Ob-
5 thereunder,1 26 are the basis for a private right of action for securities
fraud. Under 10b-5, a plaintiff must establish scienter and causation, and is
subject to the heightened pleading standards of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which, inter alia, require plaintiffs to plead
particularized facts that establish a "strong inference" of scienter in order
to overcome a motion to dismiss.127
1. VoiceStream Allegations
Deutsche Telekom filed a registration statement with the SEC on May
22, 2000, as part of a global offering of 200 million shares, 45 million of
which were to be sold as American Depository Receipts (ADSs).1 28
Plaintiffs alleged that by June 16, 2000, the effective date of the
Registration Statement, Deutsche Telekom "had already completed
advanced merger negotiations with VoiceStream," 129 agreeing to offer
$200 per share for VoiceStream's stock and planning to fund the
transaction primarily by issuing millions of shares of Deutsche Telekom
stock. 130 The prospectus contained a general reference to Deutsche
Telekom's strategy of growth by acquisition, as follows:
Deutsche Telekom and its affiliates are actively considering
and discussing a number of potential acquisition transactions.
These may be made using newly issued shares or in the
aggregate be material to Deutsche Telekom or its affiliates,
cash or a combination of cash and shares, and may
individually or in the aggregate be material to Deutsche
Telekom or its affiliates. Discussions with third parties may
be commenced or discontinued at any time. 31
Plaintiffs alleged this statement was materially false and misleading,
and omitted to disclose material facts, because it failed to disclose the
advanced negotiations with VoiceStream.1 32
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012)).
`6 17 C.F.R. 240.1Ob-5 (2014).
127 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat. 737,
743 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2XA) (2012)).
12 In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., No. 00 CIV 9475 SHS, 2002 WL 244597, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002).
129 Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 33.
'30 Id. 129.
13' DEUTSCHE TELEKOM, SUPPLEMENT No. 3 TO THE SALES PROSPECTUS DATED MAY 26, 2000,
at 4 (2000), http://www.telekom.com/investor-relations/publications//IPO-s-1996-2000/201632 (follow
"DT3 in 2000" hyperlink) [hereinafter DT PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT].
132 Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, 129.
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The plaintiffs set forth the timeline of the merger negotiations as
follows:
The plaintiffs alleged that Deutsche Telekom contacted John W.
Stanton, the chairman and chief executive officer of VoiceStream on
March 7, 2000 to inform him Deutsche Telekom was interested in
acquiring VoiceStream and to arrange a meeting.133 They further alleged
that Stanton and Ron Sommer met on March 13, 2000 in New York to
discuss Deutsche Telekom's interest in acquiring VoiceStream.' 34 Later
that month, on March 29, 2000, a second meeting occurred at which
Deutsche Telekom outlined its proposal for a share exchange.' 3  Stanton
allegedly rejected the proposal because, inter alia, Deutsche Telekom's
shares were not publicly traded. 13 6
In the meantime, Deutsche Telekom proceeded with its Global
Offering and the preparation for its U.S. Registration Statement and public
listing of the ADSs on the New York Stock Exchange.1 3 7 On May 22,
2000, Deutsche Telekom filed its Registration Statement with the SEC.138
Then on June 1, 2000, Deutsche Telekom allegedly contacted VoiceStream
again to ask whether VoiceStream would consider an equity investment.1 3 9
VoiceStream responded by saying it would consider a written proposal "if
it was submitted no later than early June."1 40 Sommer and Stanton further
discussed the acquisition by telephone.141
Five days later, on June 6, 2000, Deutsche Telekom submitted its
written proposal to acquire all of VoiceStream's shares at a price within the
range of $170-$190 per share.1 4 2 On June 12, 2000, Stanton replied in
writing that VoiceStream would not consider an offer for less than $200
per share, part of which would have to be consideration in cash.1 4 3
VoiceStream also offered to permit Deutsche Telekom to begin limited due
diligence if Deutsche Telekom believed it could raise its offer to $200 per
share.14 4 On June 15, 2000, Stanton and Sommer discussed the terms of the
' Id. I 33(a).
134Id
"' Id. 33(b).
136 Id
m Id. 26.
138 In Re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., No. 00 CIV 9475 SHS, 2002 WL 244597, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002); Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, 1 1.
1' Deutsche Telekom, 2002 WL 244597, at *2; Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint,
supra note 1, 1 33(c).
" Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, 1 33(c).
141 Id.
42 Deutsche Telekom, 2002 WL 244597, at *2; Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint,
supra note 1, ¶ 33(d).
14 Sources cited supra note 142.
144Id.
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deal again, according to the plaintiffs.1 4 5 Deutsche Telekom allegedly
agreed to offer at least $200 per share for VoiceStream stock, and
VoiceStream began providing Deutsche Telekom with due diligence
materials.'
On June 16, 2000, Deutsche Telekom's Registration Statement became
effective. It included no mention of VoiceStream.1 4 7 The fiRal sales
prospectus, which was dated June 17, 2000, again included no mention of
VoiceStream.1 4 8
The share offering was a firm commitment underwriting by which the
underwriters agreed to buy 200 million ordinary shares of Deutsche
Telekom from KfW as part of a global offering in fifteen European
countries and the United States.1 49 KfW paid underwriting commissions
and fees in the amount of $1.033 per ADS. 50 The underwriters also had
the option and did purchase another 30 million shares from KfW to cover
overallotments."'5 The offering price by the underwriters to the public was
$64.38 per share. 5 2 On June 16, 2000, the effective date of the Registration
Statement, the closing price of the ADSs on the NYSE was $65 per
share. 53
On July 11, 2000, news broke that Deutsche Telekom planned to pay
at least $30 billion to acquire VoiceStream.1 54 The share price of Deutsche
Telekom dropped on this news. 55 Additional details about the Deutsche
Telekom/VoiceStream merger were disclosed in the news from July 12
through July 23, 2000.
Finally, on July 24, 2000, Deutsche Telekom publicly announced its
planned $50.7 billion acquisition of VoiceStream.1 56 The disclosure
reported VoiceStream shareholders would receive 3.2 shares of Deutsche
Telekom and $30 in cash for each share as consideration for the merger.i5 7
"Continuing the downward trend of the previous days in reaction to news
141 Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, 133(e).
146 id
1 Deutsche Telekom, 2002 WL 244597, at *2.
14 Id.
149 Id
'" Id.
151
15 Id.
" Malcolm Fried, Deutsche Telekom in U.S. Deal?, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 2000), http://articles.la
times.com/2000/jul/l1/business/fi-51028 [https://perma.cc/X3W4-Y3DV].
.. Deutsche Telekom, 2002 WL 244597, at *2.
" Nicole Harris et al., Deutsche Telekom, VoiceStream Boards Approve $50.5 Billion Cash,
Stock Bid, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2000, at A3.
57 Press Release, VoiceSt*ram Wireless Corp., Deutsche Telekom to Acquire VoiceStream for
$50.7 Billion, Creating First Wireless Operator Using GSM Standard Worldwide (July 24, 2000),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/946770/000095012300006755/e425.txt [https://perma.cc/9Z7
R-4UNQ].
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of the merger," the Complaint states, "shares of [Deutsche Telekom]
declined almost seven dollars per share on July 24 to approximately $45
per share."'
2. Real Estate Allegations
The U.S. plaintiffs also challenged Deutsche Telekom's Registration
Statement and Prospectus on grounds that they contained material
misstatements and omissions with respect to Deutsche Telekom's real
estate portfolio and related assets.' 5 ' The reported book value of Deutsche
Telekom's real estate assets were 17.2 billion Euros as of December 31,
1999, the final quarter of 1999.160 Deutsche Telekom's real estate assets
contributed to a total reported 37.709 billion Euros in shareholder equity as
of March 31, 2000, with total assets for the company reported at 101.477
billion Euros as of March 31, 2000.161 Deutsche Telekom had also
established certain reserves or recognized charges for each of the past three
years to cover "potential losses associated with the disposition of
properties no longer used in this business."' 62
But in February 21, 2001, only seven months after the July 19 offering,
Deutsche Telekom announced it was taking a special write-down of two
billion Euros (approximately $1.8 billion) for the land values in its real
estate portfolio.1 6 3 Deutsche Telekom's share price dropped on this
announcement.'6 Moreover, on March 19, 2001, Deutsche Telekom's
CFO, Karl-Gerhard Eich, stated "I can't say at this point whether [the two
billion Euro write-down] will be enough." 6 5
The plaintiffs alleged the company's real estate portfolio had been
substantially overvalued at the time of the Offering.'" Deutsche Telekom
had valued its real estate assets by grouping them into types of properties
and then estimating their current market value.1 67 The company claimed
this so-called "cluster method" of valuing its real estate assets represented
the best approximation of their value because the properties were too
" Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 32.
"
9 Id. 134.
160 DT PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 131, at 47.
161 Id. at 9.
162 Id. at 127.
163 Deutsche Telekom Will Incur Charge for Real-Estate Holdings, Dow JONES Bus. NEWS, Feb.
21, 2001, Factiva.
" Stock Markets Across the Globe Finish Lower as U.S. Technology Stocks Slide, Dow JONES
BUS. NEWS, Feb. 21, 2001, Factiva.
65 Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 43.
' Id. 144.
167 Boston, supra note 115.
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numerous to value individually, and historical records for the properties
were unavailable.1 6 8
The February 2001 write-down followed longstanding questions about
the cluster method. Friedrich Goerts, the former chief of Deutsche
Telekom's real estate unit, had blown the whistle on what he perceived to
be "vastly overvalued" real estate assets as early as 1995.169 Goerts and
others claimed the true market value (or fair value) of Deutsche Telekom's
real estate assets were much lower.170 Whenever the company sold
property it would have to take a write-down for realized losses."' But the
company's December 1998 and 1999 financial statements, as well as the
March 31, 2000 summary financial information for the quarter-all of
which were included in the U.S. Registration Statement-reported
Deutsche Telekom's real estate assets on the basis of the cluster method.' 72
In September 1998, Goerts finally wrote a letter to senior executives
stating he could no longer participate in what he considered to be balance
sheet fraud.7 3 Goerts was subsequently fired.1 7 4 Statements by Goerts
accusing Deutsche Telekom of balance sheet fraud were first published in
in the German news magazine Der Spiegel on February 12, 2001, and
subsequently in a March 19, 2001 Wall Street Journal article covering the
write-down.1 75
Plaintiffs charged that the U.S. Registration Statement was false and
misleading because it misreported the fair value of the real estate holdings
and failed to reconcile those numbers with U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles as required by SEC rules.'76
Because Deutsche Telekom and its CEO Ron Sommer had knowledge
of the alleged overvaluation, plaintiffs charged them with securities fraud
under Rule 1Ob-5.1 7 7
"n Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt a.M. [OLG Frankfurt] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt] July 3,
2013, Neue Zeitschrift for Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 1103, 2013 ("Dies erfolgte nicht in Form ciner
Bewertung jeder einzelnen Immobilie, vielmehr wurde nur ein Teil derselben (z.B. in Grolstadtlagen
und solche, die ab 1993 erworben worden waren) individuell bewertet, wahrend die anderen in
verschiedene Gruppen (Cluster) aufgeteilt und nach durchschnittlichen Werten filr diese Cluster
bewertet wurden.").
169 Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, 1 44(a).
170 Boston, supra note 115.
171 Id.
" Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, IN 49-50; DT PROSPECTUS
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 131, at 46-47, 126-27, F-45 to F-46.
"' Boston, supra note 115.
174 Id.
'7 See id. (describing Goerts's fears that he was being made a scapegoat for the real estate
valuations).
" Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, 1f49-52, 54-55.7 7Id ¶¶ 89-90.
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C. The German Complaint78
The complaints filed against Deutsche Telekom in Frankfurt,
Germany, contained many additional allegations and claims against the
company, but included the two central claims that Deutsche Telekom was
liable for damages or rescission for its failure to disclose the advanced
merger negotiations with VoiceStream, and for falsely valuing its real
estate assets in its German May 2000 offering. 179 The liability claims were
actionable under Sections 44 and 45 of the German Securities Exchange
Act (BrsenGesetz).180 The real estate allegations also sounded in fraud,
with plaintiffs invoking certain tort and criminal law claims and
remedies. 8 1
Section 44 of the BoersG provides investors who have purchased
securities based on a false or incomplete statement the right to sue issuers
and other "responsible parties" for rescission or damages not to exceed the
purchase price of the securities. 18 2  Section 45(1) provides for an
affirmative defense for defendants who can show that they had no
knowledge of the mistake or omission and that their lack of knowledge did
not result from gross negligence. 18 3
The German substantive law thus differed in several respects from the
applicable U.S. substantive law in this case. While the lOb-5 securities
fraud claim in the U.S. action required a showing of knowledge or
intent,184 an issuer's liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933
"' Court filings, including the complaint (Klageschrifi), are not accessible to the public in
Germany, because they are deemed confidential. Researchers may obtain special permission from the
judge and review court files on site. This was not possible during the writing of this Article, as the files
had been transferred to the appeals court and were unavailable. In the following, I rely on published
judicial decisions and orders in the case (which review the claims in great detail), news accounts, press
releases, publications by and personal communications with plaintiff-side attorneys, as well as
discussions of the case in the academic literature, which draw on all of the above.
"' Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16, 2012,23 Kap 1/06, at 85ff, 113ff.
" Borsengesetz [BoersG] [Stock Exchange Law], July 16, 2007, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGBI
I] at 1366, repealed Dec. 6, 2012, BGBI I at 248, §§ 44-45; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court
ofJustice] May 31, 2011, Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift 2719, 2011.
' See sources cited supra note 180; see also Btlrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code],
§ 823, 1 2, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englisch-bgb/englischbgb.html#p3484
[http://web.archive.org/web/20160416172619/https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch bgb/englisc
h-bgb.html] (defining the civil law claim for damages); Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], § 264,
translation at http://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englisch-stgb/englisch stgb.html#p2192 [https://per
ma.cc/QTP7-8JPS] (defining criminal subsidy fraud); Patrick S. Ryan, Understanding Director &
Officer Liability in Germany for Dissemination of False Information: Perspectives from an Outsider, 4
GERMAN L.J. 439, 473 (2003) (discussing the applicable German laws related to liability arising from a
false statement).
182 Birsengesetz [BoersG] [Stock Exchange Law], July 16, 2007, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGBI
] at 1366, repealed Dec. 6, 2012, BGBI I at 248, § 44.
183 Id. § 45.
`4 See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2014).
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for material mistakes or omissions in a registration statement admits of no
defense and does not require a showing of negligence."'
This difference in substantive law might alone have accounted for the
different outcomes in the United States and in Germany, but the German
court never got to rule on the affirmative defense. Instead it decided the
case by finding the prospectus was not materially false or misleading with
regard to both the VoiceStream and real estate allegations.'8 Both the U.S.
and German outcomes therefore turned on whether the prospectuses were
materially false or misleading.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LITIGATION
A. Development of the Litigation in the Southern District ofNew York
In the Southern District of New York, the case proceeded fairly
rapidly. The class action complaint in the original case was filed on
December 13, 2000' 8 7-before Deutsche Telekom's February 2001 write-
down of $2 billion in real estate assets.188 Judge Stein set the initial case
management conference for January 26, 2001.189 On March 22, 2001, the
cases were consolidated before Judge Stein.'" On April 11, 2001, the well-
known plaintiff-side firms, Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz and Milberg
Weiss were appointed as counsel to co-lead plaintiffs.19' The Judge issued
a scheduling order on July 16, 2001, requiring the first set of document
requests to be served by July 27, 2001 and production of documents by
September 28, 2001.192 A year after the announcement of the VoiceStream
merger, the cases had thus been consolidated and discovery commenced.1 9 3
KfW was dismissed from the case on February 20, 2002.194 Judge Stein
granted class certification shortly thereafter, on October 29, 2002.195
Discovery lasted just over two years, with defendants repeatedly seeking
extensions of discovery, especially with respect to the real estate issues.1 96
i" Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 11, 48 Stat. 74, 82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(2012)).
1" Bundesgerichtshof [BGHJ [Federal Court of Justice] May 31, 2011, Neue Juristische
Wochenzeitschrift 2719, 2011.
" Docket, In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., No. 00 CIV 9475 SHS, 2002 WL 244597
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002).
in Deutsche Telekom Will Incur Charge for Real-Estate Holdings, supra note 163.
'" Docket, supra note 187.
190 d
'9 Id
19 Id.193 Id.
194 Id.
'" In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., 229 F. Supp. 2d 277, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
'n See Docket, supra note 187. The list of filings during the discovery phase can be found
between docket entry numbers 62-74.
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Plaintiffs took over thirty depositions and reviewed over 1.9 million
documents. 19 7
One week before the October 13, 2003 final discovery deadline, the
investment banks and underwriters moved for summary judgment. 98 The
parties exchanged memoranda on the motions for summary judgment,
which were never filed.'" The parties then took more than a year to
negotiate a settlement and applied for judicial approval of a settlement on
January 28, 2005.200 The settlement required Deutsche Telekom to pay
$120 million to the plaintiffs' class fund.2 0' The other defendants paid
nothing (except perhaps their legal fees).202 In the settlement, the
defendants admitted to no wrongdoing.203
B. Development of the German Litigation
In the Deutsche Telekom litigation, thousands of plaintiffs swamped
the judiciary at the district court in Frankfurt (Frankfurter Landesgericht)
to which the cases were assigned. 204 The plaintiffs in the German litigation
were mostly retail investors who had purchased Deutsche Telekom shares
subject to the German offering. 2 05 Total claims were around 100 million
Euros, and the average claim was valued at around 5,900 Euros.20' Because
there were three Deutsche Telekom share issuances in Germany, but only
one in the United States, the German litigation against Deutsche Telekom
also involved claims relating to the real estate valuations of the earlier
German prospectuses going back to 1996.207 All told, 17,000 shareholders
who purchased in these three issuances brought claims before the German
regional court in Frankfurt by the end of 2003.208 The large volume of
cases overwhelmed the Frankfurt court. Because there was no class action
mechanism, each case would have to be treated separately and tried
separately.209
" Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at 5, Deutsche Telekom, 229 F. Supp. 2d 277 (No.
00-CV-9475), http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1016/USDO0/2005128_rO4s_00CV947
5.pdf [https://perma.ce/ZS2P-HF9E].
'9 Id at 4.
'9 Id; Telephone Interview with Robert Wallner, Counsel for Plaintiffs, Milberg LLP (Dec. 30,
2014).
- Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 197, at 19.
201Id. at .
202 d
203 Id. at 22.
204 Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1488-89.
205 Id.; Tilp, supra note 16, at 332-33.
206 Tilp & Roth, supra note 9, at 132.
20 German litigants referred to these three issuances as DTI (1996), DT2 (1998), and DT3 (in
June 2000). Tilp, supra note 16, at 332-33.
200 Id. at 332.
20 Id at 332-33.
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The first complaints were filed in late 2001 .210 But the court in
Frankfurt did not hold its first hearing in the matter until November 11,
2004.211 The hearing took place only after the German constitutional court
(BGH) had weighed in on the lengthy delay in the process. 2 12 To handle the
flood of cases, the Frankfurt regional court selected ten pilot cases that
raised the most important issues for expedited proceeding.2 13
Note that, by this time, the U.S. parties had already long concluded
discovery and were presumably negotiating a settlement. In Germany, by
contrast, the plaintiffs had, at this point, received no information from the
defendants, and the German court's interrogation of its first witness would
have to wait another three-and-a-half years. 214 To overcome their lack of
company internal information, attorneys for the German plaintiffs sought
to benefit from the parallel proceedings in the United States. 2 15 They knew
that the case there had progressed rapidly and was going through full
discovery.2 16 In January of 2003, they thus filed a petition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1782 to obtain discovery produced in the U.S. litigation. 217
C. The German Plaintifs 'Attempt to Obtain Evidence from Overseas
28 U.S.C. § 1782 provides that a district court may direct that a person
who resides or is found in the district "give his testimony or statement
or ... produce a document or other thing for use in a . . . foreign or
international tribunal." 2 18 "The statute affords access to discovery of
evidence in the United States for use in foreign proceedings." 2 19 The
request may come from "any interested person." 220 But while the statute
"authorizes" a judge to grant such discovery, it also gives judges broad
discretion to, inter alia, consider the sovereignty interests of other countries
in their own administration ofjustice.22 1
210 Id at 332.
211 Id at 338-39.
212 Id. at 345.
213 Id.
2 14 Id. at 314.
215 Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1490.
216 Id
217 Id.; see also Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2004)
(denying the petition for discovery).
218 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012).
219 In re Schmitz, 259 F. Supp. 2d 294, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting In re Edelman, 295 F.3d
171, 175 (2d. Cir 2002)).
2 20 Id.
221 See In re Application for an Order for Judicial Assistance in a Foreign Proceeding in the High
Court of Justice, Chancery Division, England, 147 F.R.D. 223, 226 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ("The intent
behind [28 U.S.C. § 1782] was to facilitate compliance by U.S. citizens with foreign court proceedings
and to maintain respect for foreign countries' sovereign jurisdiction.").
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The use of § 1782 is a topic of great interest to cross-border litigation
in that it affords those who litigate in international tribunals or foreign
countries a remarkable opportunity for obtaining information about a
party-opponent that they would ordinarily be unable to obtain under non-
U.S. procedural rules. There is a small but longstanding practice by
European litigants to attempt to obtain discovery against party-opponents
in the United States. 2 22
In their § 1782 petition to Judge Stein in the S.D.N.Y., the German
plaintiffs contended that the U.S. securities class action litigation then
pending before the court had "substantially identical" allegations to the
allegations in the German actions.2 23 They sought to obtain all documents
that had by that time been produced by Deutsche Telekom's U.S. counsel,
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, to the lead plaintiffs' counsel, Milberg Weiss
and Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz. 2 24 Milberg and Bernstein took no
position as to the production of documents, but Deutsche Telekom
objected, arguing they had conducted discovery in the U.S. action in
reliance on a discovery confidentiality order.225 More importantly,
Deutsche Telekom cited strong objections by the German government and
judiciary.226
In opposition to the petition of the German investors for access to the
U.S. discovery materials, Cravath filed letters from the Bonn prosecutor
and the German Ministry of Justice opposing the production on the
grounds that it would compromise an ongoing criminal investigation into
Deutsche Telekom's real estate valuations.2 27 The German authorities and
experts for Cravath pointed out that German law prohibited sharing a
prosecutor's documents and files in an ongoing investigation because it
would jeopardize the investigation and violate the privacy rights of the
accused.2 28 The German government also noted that the German plaintiffs
had already requested the documents from the Bonn prosecutor, who had
refused to grant such access for just this reason. 229 Allowing the German
plaintiffs to obtain these documents from the United States would allow
them to perform an end-run around the German judicial authorities, thus
implicating German sovereignty interests. 23 0 According to the German
22 See generally Lauren Ann Ross, A Comparative Critique to U.S. Courts' Approach to E-
Discovery in Foreign Trials, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 313 (2012) (discussing jurisprudence
governing this practice).
m Schmitz, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
224 Id.
225Id
2 6 Id. at 298.
27 Id at 296.
228 Id at 299.
229 Id. at 297.
20 Id.
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Ministry for Justice, the prosecutor's office would reconsider the German
plaintiff's request for access to the documents at a later date.23 '
As mentioned above, the state prosecutor in Bonn had initiated a
criminal investigation into Deutsche Telekom's valuation of its real estate
transactions in connection with its securities issuances.2 3 2  The
investigations were terminated in the spring of 2005, with Deutsche
Telekom entering a consent decree that required it to contribute five
million Euros to charitable organizations.2 33
Following the conclusion of the criminal investigation, in May of
2005, the regional court in Bonn (LG) finally did afford plaintiffs limited
access to the Bonn prosecutor's files.2 34 Plaintiffs recounted that they
received over fifty boxes of documents and files from the Bonn
prosecutor's investigations into Deutsche Telekom's real estate
valuations. 235 This was by far the largest trove of documents obtained by
the German plaintiffs in support of their case.236
But it is also important to note that they would never have come into
possession of these documents if there had been no criminal investigation
of Deutsche Telekom's real estate valuations. Accordingly, the German
plaintiffs were unable to obtain the vast majority of documents from
Deutsche Telekom regarding the VoiceStream allegations, because these
allegations were not the subject of a German criminal investigation.237
D. The "Deutsche Telekom" Law
The Deutsche Telekom litigation is frequently cited in the recent
German literature as a prime example of the kind of "mass damages"
litigation that calls for an aggregate litigation mechanism. 2 38 As already
noted, over 17,000 claimants swamped the judiciary at the district court in
Frankfurt. 23 9 The judicial system simply could not process such a large
number of claims by adhering to civil procedure rules that were based on
the German (civil law) model of a dispute between two parties.2 4 0 And the
231 Id.
2 3 2 Id at 295.
m Tilp, supra note 16, at 353.
23 Id. at 339.
m Interview with Andreas Tilp, named partner with T[LP Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH, in
Kirchentellinsfurt, Ger. (July 2015).
23
6 id
2 Id
2' Andrd Janssen, Auf dem Weg zu Einer Europdischen Sammelklage?, in EUROPAISCHEN
SAMMELKLAGE, supra note 13, at 3, 5-6; KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 20.
239 Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1488-89.
24 Tilp, supra note 16, at 333.
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cases languished for three years without any hearings. Commentators
spoke of a "collapse" of the judicial system.24 1
The German parliament responded by passing the "Capital Markets
Model Procedure Act" (Kapitalmusterverfahrensgesetz, or "KapMuG") to
render the resolution of damages and rescission claims arising out of
securities disclosure violations more efficient.242 As a result of this close
connection between the passage of KapMuG and the Deutsche Telekom
litigation, KapMuG is also frequently referred to as the "Deutsche
Telekom Law."243
KapMuG, which became effective in November of 2005, provided for
an experimental civil procedure limited to claims of securities disclosure
violations. 244 In other words, it does not apply trans-substantively to
consumer protection or antitrust claims, but was intended as a pilot project
for the adjudication of mass claims that might be expanded to other
substantive areas of the law in the future.2 4 5 The law had a sunset provision
that would expire in 2012 unless renewed by the German Parliament,
which it was with certain amendments.246
The KapMuG procedure does not create a U.S.-type class action where
claims are bundled in a pre-trial phase and then prosecuted (or settled) by a
representative for the class. Rather, it keeps all claims separate, but tries
common questions of law and fact in a "model proceeding"
(Musterverfahren), which is binding as to the issues presented and resolved
in that "model proceeding." 2 47 Thus, there is no bundling of claims, but a
bundling of issues common to a particular controversy
(Lebenssachverhalt).24 8 The KapMuG proceeding has three phases.
First, plaintiffs or defendants in an existing action may file applications
for the initiation of a special model proceeding
(Musterverfahrensantrag/Model Proceeding Application) with the trial
241 KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 30-31; Verse, supra note 40, at 451.
242 ASSMANN & SCHOTZE, supra note 40, §§ 44-46 (describing significance of KapMug for
private securities enforcement); Andr6 Janssen, Aufdem Weg zu Einer Europdischen Sammelklage?, in
EUROPAISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE, supra note 13, at 3, 6 (describing European goals for greater
efficiency); Verse, supra note 40, at 451 (stating that the KapMuG procedure "aims at reducing the
workload for the courts and the litigation costs for the parties").
243 ASSMANN & SCHUTZE, supra note 40, § 44.
24 Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets Model Case Act] Aug.
16, 2005, BGBI I at 243, § 1, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englischkapmug/
index.html [https://perma.cc/7BYT-HY6G].
245 This generated criticism in the Bundesrat that investors were being afforded special procedural
advantages. Fabian Reuschle, Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz-Eine Erste
Bestandsaufnahme aus Sicht der Praxis, in EUROPAISCHEN SAMMILKLAGE, supra note 13, at 277, 278
(describing the legislative debate about the need for a more efficient litigation process in connection
with securities fraud).
246 id
247 KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 34-35.
2' KapMuG § 4; KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 35, 230.
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court.249 If at least ten such applications are made (or ten or more joint
parties make such application), then the trial court initiates a preparatory
proceeding (Vorlageverfahren/Preparatory Proceeding), in which common
questions of law and fact are identified and then compiled into a formal
brief of questions and issues to be presented (VorlagebeschlufJ/Brief of
Questions Presented). 25 0 This special brief is then certified to a higher court
(Oberlandesgericht) for decision.25 1
The second phase consists of the actual model proceeding
(MusterverfahrenlModel Proceeding) before the higher court.2 52 In the
Model Proceeding, the higher court essentially "tries" the issues or
questions presented. Recall here that in civil law countries, courts of appeal
are not limited to the record established in a trial court, but may take
evidence under proper circumstances and need not defer to the factual
findings of the court below. 25 3 The higher court then issues an opinion in
the form of a set of "determinations" (Feststellungen) regarding the
questions presented (Musterentscheid/Opinion Regarding Questions
Presented).2 54 During the time the model proceeding takes place, all related
cases in the trial court are stayed.255
In the third phase, after the higher court has issued and published its
Opinion Regarding Questions Presented, the individual actions that were
stayed during the model proceeding are taken up again separately by the
trial court and decided separately, based, in relevant part, on the
determinations of the higher court in the Model Proceeding.2 56 In other
words, the higher court's Opinion Regarding Questions Presented has an
issue-preclusive effect.
In its application for a Model Proceeding, a party must establish that
the issues proposed for resolution in the Model Proceeding represent
common issues of law or fact in parallel actions currently pending.257 Once
the trial court receives a Model Proceeding Application from a party to an
action, it must publish the application on its docket (Kiageregister), upon
which the individual action is automatically stayed.258 The stay serves the
KapMuG's goal of increasing the efficiency of civil adjudication and
conserving judicial resources, in that it avoids duplication of effort in
evidence acquisition, fact-finding, and the determination of law in parallel
249 KapMuG § 2(1); KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 36.
' KapMuG § 6; KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 36-37.
251 KapMuG § 6; KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note I1, at 36-37.
252 KapMuG § 6; KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note I1, at 37.
253 MURRAY & STI)RNER, supra note 22, at 609.
m KapMuG § 16; KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 496ff.
a KapMuG §§ 5, 8(1); KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 36, 245ff
25 KapMuG § 22; KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note I1, at 38.
257 KapMuG § 2.
25 KapMuG §§ 3(2), 5; KOLNER KOMMEN-TAR, supra note I1, at 245ff.
848 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:817
THE AMERICAN ADVANTAGE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE?
259
actions.25 It falls to the trial court to determine whether the ten Model
Proceeding Applications required to initiate a Model Proceeding, in fact,
raise common issues of law or fact, and which questions or issues of law or
fact are to be certified to the higher court.26 0 The focus in this inquiry is
whether the applications arise out of the same set of facts and
circumstances (Lebenssachverhalt), roughly like the joinder and preclusion
inquiries operate in federal court.26 1
The goal of this new aggregate procedure was to increase the
efficiency with which mass claims would be disposed of. In Deutsche
Telekom, for example, the resolution of common questions in a Model
Proceeding would consolidate evidence acquisition and fact-finding in
hundreds or thousands of individual cases, regarding the accuracy of
Deutsche Telekom's prospectus. 262 But in so doing, the KapMuG also
clashes with fundamental principles of German (and common law) civil
procedure.
One such principle is that parties to a dispute should have overall
control over the nature and scope of the civil litigation
(Dispositionsmaxime), including its initiation, the issues presented, the
relief requested, the presentation of evidence, and the termination of the
suit.263 The principle of party control is a fundamental principle of due
process that permeates German and civil law procedure. 2 64 A corollary to
this principle is the "Principle of Party Presentation"
(Beibringungsgrundsatz), which provides that the parties themselves are
responsible for determining the means of proof and identifying the
evidence to support their claims or defenses. 26 5 While these principles
seem consistent with federal procedure, their interpretation in the context
of the civil law tradition results in markedly different rights and
procedures.
The German principle of party control (Dispositionsmaxime) militates
against full-fledged representative litigation as it is practiced in the U.S.
class action. 26 The adjudication of common issues of law and fact in a
representative proceeding that is preclusive for all class members,
259 KapMuG § 2(1); Fabian Reuschle, Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz-Eine Erste
Bestandsaufinahme aus Sicht der Praxis, in EUROPAISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE, supra note 13, at 277,
278-79.
260 See KapMuG §§ 3(1), 6 (discussing the circumstances under which the court trying the matter
will deny the application as inadmissible and the procedure of reference to the Higher Regional Court).
261 Fabian Reuschle, Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz--Eine Erste Bestandsaufnahme
aus Sicht der Praxis, in EUROPAISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE, supra note 13, at 277, 278-79.
262 Id. at 278.
263 MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 154-56. This principle is also referred to as the "party
principle" (Parleiprinzip).
264 Id. at 156.
265 KUO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAw 21-22 (2003).
266 KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 60.
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including those who never agreed to join the proceedings, is anathema to
the German right to control one's own case presentation. The KapMuG
thus eshews full-fledged representative litigation and keeps individual
cases separate, even as it resolves shared questions of law and fact in the
Model Proceeding-but it does so at a cost to efficiency. Moreover, the
Model Proceeding does not bind non-litigants, thus distinguishing itself
from the U.S. opt-out model. 267
Nonetheless, at least two structural features of the KapMuG have
raised constitutional concerns.
First, the trial judge's substantial influence on generating the Brief of
Questions Presented, which is then submitted for litigation to the higher
court, involves a level of judicial control over the presentation of the issues
in the case that sits uncomfortably with the principle of party control.268
Second, the KapMuG's selection of a few "test cases" that will be
litigated and will generate determinations binding on all the parties still
contravenes the principle of party presentation. Under the original statute,
parties not selected to participate in the Model Proceeding had limited (or
no) influence on the presentation of facts in a proceeding that could have a
decisive influence on the outcome in their own cases. 2 69 The courts have
responded to this due process issue by giving the other parties the status of
intervenors, with a right to present evidence in the Model Proceeding as
well, thus mitigating the concern that they will be bound by proceedings in
which they had no voice. 27 0
Generally speaking, however, the KapMuG proceeding is subject to all
of the standard procedural requirements of the German civil procedure
code,27 1 which, as we shall see, imposes substantial limitations on the
parties' (and especially the plaintiffs') ability to engage in fact
investigation.
E. The Deutsche Telekom KapMuG Proceeding
In December of 2005, shortly after the effective date of KapMuG,
plaintiffs in one of the pilot cases filed their application for a model
proceeding. 272 Others soon followed. 2 73 The lower Frankfurt Regional
267 Id. at 4(-41.
268 Id at 60-61, 297.
269 Id. at 62.
270 Id. at 66-67; Tilp, supra note 16, at 355.
271 KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 60.
2" Landesgericht Frankfurt/Main [LG Frankfurt/Main] [Regional Court Frankfurt/Main], July 19,
2006, 3/07 OHG 1/06; Tilp, supra note 16, at 347. Winkler is the "model claimaint" challenging the
June 1999 share offering (DT2), regarding, inter alia, the real estate valuations in the DT2.
273 In the following, I rely on decisions in the case of Kiefer against Deutsche Telekom, because
Kiefer is the "model claimant" that challenges the June 2000 share offering (DT3) regarding, inter alia,
the real estate valuations and the VoiceStream acquisition. Landesgericht Frankfurt/Main [LG
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Court drafted a 193-page Brief of Questions Presented, including thirty-
three questions or issues for resolution by the Higher Regional Court.274
The 193-page brief, which was published on July 11, 2006, included
references to documents, affidavits, and witnesses that each side would
rely on to make its case. The brief was worked out in a preparatory
proceeding based on written submissions by the various parties and
negotiations as to what could be stipulated.275 The parties' written
submissions were supported by evidence submitted to the court, including
expert assessments of Deutsche Telekom's real estate valuations.276
On July 25, 2006, the Higher Regional Court chose the "model
claimant" (or perhaps lead plaintiff) for the claims arising out of the June
2000 offering.2 77 But evidentiary hearings would not begin until April 14,
2008.278 The delay was in part due to amendments to the Brief of Questions
Presented sought by the parties. 27 9 In the meantime, the lower court
encountered difficulties adjudicating which of the thousands of cases
would be stayed pending the outcome of the model proceedings-a
laborious and time-consuming process. 280 This process took nearly one
year, because the lower court had to make a separate determination for
each case. 2 8' Those litigants would enjoy the status of intervenors in the
model proceeding. Due process concerns about the right of the
"intervenors" (beigeladene) to a fair hearing resulted in an order by the
Frankfurt/Main] [Regional Court Frankfurt/Main], Dec. 4, 2006, 3/7 OH 1/06. As noted above, court
filings, including complaints, are not publicly available. The KapMuG, however, does require certain
court filings in the Model Proceeding to be made available to all claimants with related claims by
posting them on a website. But see Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets
Model Case Act] Aug. 16, 2005, BGBI I at 243, § 4(4), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-
intemet.de/englisch kapmug/index.html [https://perma.cc/7BYT-HY6G] (requiring Model Proceeding
Applications to be deleted upon final decision in the Model Proceeding). Certain judicial decisions, to
which I refer below, are publicly available.
274 Landesgericht Franfurt a.M. [LG Frankfurt/M] [Frankfurt Regional Court], July 11, 2006, 23
Kap 1/06, 3/7 OH 1/06; KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 58-59; Tilp & Roth, supra note 9, at
136.
275 Landesgericht Franfurt a.M. [LG Frankfurt/M] [Frankfurt Regional Court], July 11, 2006, 23
Kap 1/06, 3/7 OH 1/06; see also KapMuG § 6(l)-(2); KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note II, at 258-
67, 274-79. The proceeding is typically based on written submissions.
276 These are discussed in the Brief of Questions Presented, LG Frankfurt/Main, Vorlagebeschlu8,
Landesgericht Franfurt a.M. [LG Frankfurt/M] [Frankfurt Regional Court], July 11, 2006, 23 Kap 1/06,
3/7 OH 1/06.
277 Tilp, supra note 16, at 339.
2 78 Id. at 356.
279 KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 58; Tilp, supra note 16, at 352; AXEL HALFMEIER ET
AL., EVALUATION DES KAPITALANLEGER-MUSTERVERFAHRENSGESETZES 28 (2009), http://docplayer.
org/1 360128-Evaluation-des-kapitalanleger-musterverfahrensgesetzes.html [https://perma.cc/GX3N-
RPV9].
20 Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets Model Case Act] Aug.
16, 2005, BGBI I at 243, § 7, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englisch-kapmug/index.
html [https://perma.cc/7BYT-HY6G]; Tilp, supra note 16, at 352.
281 HALFMEIER ET AL., supra note 279, at 28.
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Higher Regional Court to grant parties the right to actively participate in
the model proceeding and give the attorneys for all of the parties access to
all the pleadings and briefs on a password-protected website. 28 2 This is of
interest, because it introduced a level of publicity into the proceedings that
is ordinarily not contemplated by German civil procedure. 28 3
Hearings before the Higher Regional Court began on April 4, 2008.28
Thirteen full days of hearings were held during April and May during
which the court heard testimony from sixteen witnesses, mostly executives
of the defendant Deutsche Telekom. 2 85
An important victory for the plaintiffs was a decision by the court to
order the Deutsche Telekom defendants to produce transcripts of four of
the depositions that were taken in the U.S. litigation.286 These depositions
became part of the record, and were relied on, inter alia, as corroborating
evidence by the German court. 28 7 The court also required the defendants to
produce some of the exhibits U.S. plaintiffs' counsel had obtained in
discovery and used to interrogate the deponents in the U.S. action.288 The
German plaintiffs (and the court) were thus afforded access to at least some
of the emails and electronic data relating to their VoiceStream claims-
documents which they would not have been able to obtain under German
procedural rules.
It is worth noting that the German plaintiffs were able to obtain the
depositions by judicial order only because they knew that these documents
were in the possession of the defendant Deutsche Telekom and knew what
they contained based on information they had about the U.S. proceedings.
The principle of presentation (Beibringungsmaxime) requires each party to
provide proof to support its own claims and defenses.2 89 As Huang has
noted, this "makes it perfectly appropriate and legitimate for a party to
hold back adverse material that has decisive bearing on the outcome of the
litigation, and to obtain victory simply because his opponent has no access
' KapMuG §§ 4, 6; Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional
Court Frankfurt], Sept. 25, 2007, 23 Kap. 1/06; Tilp, supra note 16, at 355.
283 Unlike court filings in the United States, briefs to the court are not accessible to the public in
Germany, but court administration does have discretion to provide access to such material upon special
request to legal scholars for research purposes.
284 Tilp, supra note 16, at 340.
285 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16, 2012, 23 Kap 1/06, at 73 (paginated original on file with author); Tilp, supra note 16, at 340-
41, 356-57.
286 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
Aug. 6, 2008, 23 Kap 1/06 (requiring Deutsche Telekom to produce depositions of Sommer, Eick,
Hedberg, and (relevant portions of) the deposition ofRicke); Tilp, supra note 16, at 340-41, 356-57.
m Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16, 2012, 23 Kap 1/06, at 85-104.
28 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
Aug. 6, 2008, 23 Kap 1/06.
289 HUANG, supra note 265, at 21-22; MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 263-64.
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to that material." 2 90 A party-opponent generally cannot be forced to
produce documentary evidence to support a party's claims or defenses
under civil law, except under very limited circumstances, and then only by
order of the court.2 91 At best a party may make a request for an order to
produce "a document" (referred to in the code in the singular), and the
request "must identify the document requested with reasonable specificity,
describe its relevance to some fact in issue, and set forth the basis for the
belief that it is in the possession of control of the opponent." 2 92 Blanket
requests for "all documents relating to . . . ."-as is typical of a Request for
the Production of Documents and Things Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-are not contemplated.293
The German court took another four years to issue its main decision in
the model proceeding. The opinion, ruling in favor of Deutsche Telekom
on both the VoiceStream allegations and real estate valuation issues, was
published on May 16, 2012 and is 184 pages long. 294 I discuss the opinion
in detail in Part V below. It is worth noting the unusual length and factual
detail of the opinion, which stands out amidst the typically concise
summary opinions of no more than a few pages that German courts usually
issue.
After the Regional Court in Frankfurt issued its opinion in the Model
Proceedings, plaintiffs appealed to the German Federal Court in Karlsruhe
(Bundesgerichtshof).29 During the appeal the individual cases remained
290 HUANG, supra note 265, at 27.
291 In the nineteenth century, U.S. common law adhered to the same principle and only courts of
equity could obtain information from a party-opponent, which required a bill in equity. Stephen N.
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 918, 929 (1987). This changed with the "discovery revolution"
initiated by the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937 and its subsequent
development up until the 1970s. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1406-09, 1415 (discussing
the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which emphasized the importance of an extended
discovery period to facilitate broad fact investigation by both parties).
292 MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 277; see also ZivilprozeBordnung [ZPO] [civil
procedure statute] Dec. 5, 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I at 3202, §§ 421-24, translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englischzpo/englisch_zpo.html#pl645 [http://web.archive.org/web/
20160305135918/https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch zpo/englisch zpo.html] (stating that if a
party tendering evidence alleges that a document is held by the other party, they can file a petition that
the court direct the other party to produce the document).
293 It was only in 2001 that the German Civil Code was amended to include "relevance" as a basis
for obtaining a document from a party opponent. Prior to that it was required that a party show it had an
independent legal right to the possession or use of the document. MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22,
at 277-78.
294 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16, 2012, 23 Kap. 1/06.
29 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Oct. 21, 2014, XI ZB 12/12,
http://juris.bundesgerichtshofde/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht-bgh&Art-en&nr=6967
5&pos=0&anz-l [https://perma.cclEJ67-67NY]. The Bundesgerichtshof serves as a type of Federal
Supreme Court for non-constitutional issues.
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suspended. Plaintiffs declined to appeal the Regional Court's decision on
the VoiceStream allegations because they felt they had insufficient
evidence on this count.29 They did, however, appeal the Regional Court's
decision that Deutsche Telekom's offering properly disclosed the value of
its real estate assets.297
In addition, the plaintiffs appealed a third issue, which was not
accorded as much attention in the KapMuG proceedings or the U.S.
litigation. The third issue was whether Deutsche Telekom had properly
accounted for the sale of its holdings in the U.S. telecommunications
company Sprint to one of Deutsche Telekom's affiliates. 298 Deutsche
Telekom had booked the transaction as a sale, but the German plaintiffs
claimed that the transaction was merely a transfer within Deutsche
Telekom's group of affiliated businesses.299 It took another two years, until
October 12, 2014, for the federal panel to render its decision. 300 After
thirteen years of litigation, the case is not over. The Federal Supreme Court
affirmed the Higher Court's ruling that Deutsche Telekom's overvaluation
of its real estate assets did not rise to the level of materiality."o' But it
reversed as to the accounting for the Sprint shares and held that the June
2000 prospectus was materially false in this regard.302 This unexpected
decision means that the lower courts must at the very least now contend
with the issues of damages and causation, and potentially litigate the
question of fault.30 3
29 Interview with Andreas Tilp, supra note 235.
29 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Sept. 18, 2012, Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 10607.
29 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Oct 21, 2014, XI ZB 12/12,
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht-bgh&Art-en&nr=6967
5&pos=0&anz-1l [https://perma.cc/EJ67-67NY].
29 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16, 2012, 23 Kap 1/06, at 163ff; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Oct. 21,
2014, XI ZB 12/12, at 37, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?G
ericht-bgh&Art-en&nr-69675&pos=0&anz-1 [https://perma.cc/S26M-N7S7].
o Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Oct. 21, 2014, Xl ZB 12/12,
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht-bgh&Art-en&nr-6967
5&pos-0&anz-1 [https://perma.cc/5AQH-Y3DV].
301 Id
302 d
' Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Oct. 21, 2014, XI ZB 12/12, at 49,
http://juris.bundesgerichtshofde/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht-bgh&Art-en&nr-6967
5&pos=0&anz-1 [https://perma.cc/EAM2-ML7M]. Recall that liability for mistakes in an offering
under Sections 44-45 of the Borsengesetz is not as strict as it is under Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933, but affords defendants the affirmative defense that they did not act negligently or acted with
ordinary negligence. Only gross negligence results in liability under German law, but the burden of
proof is on the defendant.
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V. SUBSTANTIVE LAW APPLIED TO THE FACTS
The most viable claims against Deutsche Telekom, both in the United
States and in Germany, were that the issuer had sold securities subject to a
materially false or misleading registration statement and prospectus.
As previously noted, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 subjects
an issuer to strict liability for false or misleading statements in a
prospectus, an extraordinary provision considering comparable common
law tort standards. 304 The main issue for claims under Section 11 is
whether the registration statement is materially false or misleading.
Similarly, the issue on which the German court decided the Deutsche
Telekom case was whether the prospectus was "materially" false or
misleading. In the following, I discuss how "materiality" is interpreted
under U.S. and German law.
A. Materiality
In the United States, "materiality" is defined in terms of what a
"reasonable investor" would "with substantial likelihood" have considered
important in making an investment decision. 305 The standard is fact
intensive and depends upon the ability of plaintiffs to obtain discovery.306
The leading case on the definition of "materiality," Basic v. Levinson, is on
point. In Basic, the Supreme Court considered whether Basic
Incorporated's statements concerning a merger were materially false or
misleading.307 The management of Basic had denied three times, over the
course of two years, that it was in merger talks with Combustion
Engineering. 308 The last denial occurred within eight weeks of Basic's
announcement that its board had endorsed Combustion Engineering's
tender offer.309 In that context, the Supreme Court rejected the bright-line
standard proposed by the defendants that a merger must be disclosed only
after the merger partners have executed an agreement in principle.310
Instead, the Court held that a fact-finder's determination as to whether
disclosure of a contingent future event, like a merger, was material
depended on "whether the 'reasonable investor' would have considered the
omitted information significant at the time."3 11
30 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 11(a), 48 Stat. 74, 82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(2012)).
3 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
- Id at 236, 240.
3 Id. at 224.
308 Id
- Id. at 227, 228.
310 Id at 232, 233.
3" Id. at 232.
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In this canonical decision, the Court thus took the TSC Industries3 12
"total mix of information" standard, applied it in the merger context, and
extended it to Rule lOb-5 securities fraud actions generally. 3 13 In TSC
Industries, the Supreme Court held that a fact is material if there is "a
substantial likelihood that the . . . fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available." 3 14 Determinations of materiality, according to
the TSC Industries Court, required "delicate assessments of the inferences
a 'reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the
significance of those inferences to him."i' This makes the inquiry into
materiality fact intensive.
The German equivalent of "material" in Section 44(1) of the Stock
Exchange Act (which applied at the time) is the term wesentlich. "
German materiality also focuses on the investor and asks whether the
investor received an appropriate (zutreffendes) picture (Bild) of the
investment, and whether the prospectus accurately and completely
informed the investor about all circumstances that are or could be material
to the investor's decision. 3 17 "A statement is considered material for
liability purposes if it is more likely than not that a reasonable investor
would take it into account when making his investment decision." 318 While
this formulation clearly tracks the U.S. standard of materiality, the
application of the German materiality standard avoids an open-ended
judicial assessment of what may or may not have been a reasonable
investor response, in favor of fixed, so-called objective standards.
B. Materiality in the Merger Context
In the merger context, where the fact-finder must determine whether a
contingent future event should have been disclosed, the Basic Court gave
additional guidance as to how the "reasonable investor" standard should be
interpreted. The Court held that "[u]nder such circumstances, materiality
'will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated
312 TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
313 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 231-32 (citing TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449).
314 TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449; see also Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 224 (describing the standard for
materiality as set forth in TSC Industries, whereby an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that its disclosure would have been considered significant by a reasonable investor).
31s TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450.
16 WOLFGANG GROB, ICAPITALMARKTRECHT 188-89 (2006). As of June 2012, Sections 21-25 of
the Act (Prospektgesetz) replaced Sections 44-47 of the Stock Exchange Act (Barsengesetz) and
Sections 13-13a of the Sales Act (Verkaufsprospektgesetz). Verse, supra note 40, at 419 n.25.
317 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16, 2012, at 46, 87-88 (citing decisional law and literature).
"' Verse, supra note 40, at 419-20 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice],
Sept. 18, 2012, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 195).
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probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the
event in light of the totality of the company activity."'
319
The assessment of the magnitude of a transaction is relatively
straightforward in the merger context. In the Deutsche Telekom case, the
$50 billion acquisition of VoiceStream, representing around 50% of
Deutsche Telekom's asset value-which ranged from $94 billion as of
December 31, 1999 to $124 billion as of December 31, 2000-clearly
represented a transaction of sufficient magnitude to warrant disclosure.320
Separately, Deutsche Telekom also had a duty to disclose, because it was
* * *321issuing securities subject to a new registration statement.
The key question for establishing Section 11 liability, based on the
VoiceStream allegations, would thus have been the probability that the
acquisition would be concluded.322 In other words, how advanced were the
merger negotiations at the time of the global offering? This question,
indeed, was also the focus of the German court's discussion as to whether
Deutsche Telekom had properly disclosed its acquisition activity in the
German prospectus.323
Based on the allegations in the amended complaint, the interest in the
merger was present at the highest levels of management as of March 2000.
Ron Sommer had had several phone calls with Mark Stanton, the
VoiceStream CEO.324 The management teams had met to explore the
numbers in the Spring of 2000.325 Deutsche Telekom made at least two
offers to VoiceStream in June of 2000, one on June 6, the other on June
15.326 Negotiations about price led Deutsche Telekom to increase its offer
to $200 per share-the final price that Deutsche Telecom paid for the
VoiceStream shares. 3 27 And towards the end of June, Deutsche Telekom
began its due diligence. 32 8 The commitment to the deal, the structure of the
319 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968)).
32 See SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETIN No. 99-MATERIALITY (1999),
https://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm [https://perma.cc/JQ73-UT34] (recognizing that
thresholds of five to ten percent have been used by auditors as a "rule of thumb," but cautioning against
the use of a simple quantitative approach); Deutsche Telekom AG, Annual Report for Fiscal Year
ending Dec. 31, 2000 (Form 20-F), at app. F3 (May 4, 2001).
321 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 1l(a), 48 Stat. 74, 82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
77k (2012)) (providing that any person may sue when any part of the registration statement contained
an untrue statement regarding a material fact, or failed to state a material fact, or was necessary to make
the statements not misleading).
'
22 See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238-39.
3 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16, 2012, 23 Kap 1/06, at 87ff.
324 Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, 1 33(a)-(c).
35 Id. ¶ 33(a), (b).
3 Id. I 33(c), (d).
327 In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., 229 F. Supp. 2d 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
328 Id.
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deal, and the price range would appear to have been available for
disclosure when the June 16 securities issuance was sold.
Because the U.S. case was settled, discovery proceeded subject to a
confidentiality agreement, and motions for summary judgment were never
filed, our ability to assess the merits of plaintiffs' case is limited. We thus
do not have access to documents, emails, or depositions in the U.S. case
either directly or indirectly through exhibits or discussions of facts in briefs
or opinions. What we do have is an unusually detailed and lengthy Opinion
Regarding Questions Presented in the Model Proceeding by the German
Oberlandesgericht in Frankfurt, which references key documents and
depositions from the U.S. case. The new KapMuG statute indeed appears
to have contributed to this unusually detailed discussion of facts on the
record by the German court. The choice of test cases, which would include
all of the central issues shared by registered claimants; the thorough
preparation of the issues raised and the evidence to be presented at the trial
court level; and the regional court's effort to make sure that the Model
Proceeding would serve to resolve as many issues as possible, resulted in
an unusually comprehensive and detailed discussion and finding of facts in
the resulting opinion. Here we can use this information in the German
opinion to reconstruct at least some of the evidence and arguments that
would have been developed by the Deutsche Telekom defendants in the
U.S. case to support a finding that the merger was not yet sufficiently
probable at the time that the U.S. Registration Statement was filed, or at
the time that the final prospectus was issued.
The German higher regional court heard eighteen witnesses, including
the senior management of Deutsche Telekom and VoiceStream, but also
frequently referenced the U.S. deposition transcripts that the court obtained
by order from Deutsche Telekom. 32 9
Deutsche Telekom's Chief Executive Officer Ron Sommer testified
that all of the discussions with VoiceStream, up until the middle of July
2000, were primarily aimed at developing and maintaining Deutsche
Telekom's contacts with VoiceStream in the context of an active and
competitive market for firms in the telecommunications industry. 33 0 During
the first six months of 2000, VoiceStream, Qwest, Sprint, and Nextel were
all in sale-of-company (or substantial investment) negotiations with
Deutsche Telekom's various suitors.33 ' By June of 2000, VoiceStream had
received several offers from third parties.332 As late as July 25, 2000,
" Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16, 2012, at 73, 90 (referencing Sommer deposition); id at 99 (referencing Hedberg and Stanton
depositions).
3 Id at 97, 99.
"' Id. at 98.
332 Id at 94.
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VoiceStream was still engaged in parallel negotiations with the European
company Orange.33 3 This is corroborated by the joint proxy statement that
Deutsche Telekom and VoiceStream filed with the SEC on July 25,
2000.334 According to Sommer and others, Deutsche Telekom's
engagement with VoiceStream from March through mid-July, including
Deutsche Telekom's offers dated June 6, June 22, and July 5 of 2000, was
aimed at retaining a seat at the table in the negotiations between
VoiceStream and other suitors.3 35 Deutsche Telekom board members
testified that the decision to enter into an agreement with VoiceStream was
made only on July 23, 2000, more than four weeks after Deutsche
Telekom's June 19 share issuance.336
According to Sommer and several other witnesses, Deutsche Telekom
was most interested in a deal with Qwest up until mid-July because a deal
with Qwest would have best advanced Deutsche Telekom's overall global
expansion strategy. 33 Deutsche Telekom's global expansion strategy was
to find an acquisition target that would further more than one of Deutsche
Telekom's five lines of business.338 Qwest satisfied these requirements, but
VoiceStream, which operated primarily as a wireless telecommunications
provider, did not.3 39 An acquisition or investment with Qwest was therefore
the focus of Deutsche Telekom's U.S. expansion activities until July of
2000.340 Only after it became evident that an agreement with Qwest would
not be reached, during a July 12, 2000 meeting in Salt Lake City between
Deutsche Telekom executives (including Sommer) and Qwest's Chairman
of the Board, did Deutsche Telekom prioritize merger negotiations with
VoiceStream.341
According to the German court, the testimony of Deutsche Telekom
and VoiceStream executives was consistent with the timing of the
negotiations that led to the July 23 agreement-in-principle.342 Testimony by
Stanton, VoiceStream's Chairman of the Board, confirmed that
VoiceStream regarded an offer of $200 per share as a precondition to any
serious negotiations.3 43 Other suitors had already offered $200 a share.34
Deutsche Telekom's June 22 offer of $200 per share was therefore merely
a condition for participating in further negotiations and did not represent an
3 33 d
334 Id
3 Id at 95-97, 99-100.
1 Id. at 92.
33 Id. at 90.
3 3 Id. at 89.
339 Id. at 89-90.
340 Id. at 90.
341 Id. at 90-91, 93.
342 Id at 95-96.
343
1 Id at 99.
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agreement. 345 As a result of its June 22 offer, Deutsche Telekom was
permitted to send a team to Seattle (VoiceStream's headquarters) to
conduct initial due diligence towards the end of June.346 Plaintiffs cited this
as evidence that an agreement had already been reached between
VoiceStream and Deutsche Telekom.347 But the German court credited the
testimony of Deutsche Telekom executives and others that such
preliminary due diligence was common to establish a proper valuation of
the target and that Deutsche Telekom had conducted similar due diligence
with Qwest, Nextel, and Cable Wireless, all of which were of interest to
Deutsche Telekom as potential investments.348
Under U.S. law, the question as to whether the advanced merger
negotiations should have been disclosed would have gone to a jury.3 49 And
we do not know what other facts a U.S. jury would have had available as a
basis to conclude that the advanced merger negotiations were material and
should have been disclosed. According to Basic, the jury would have had
to engage in the following inquiry:
Generally, in order to assess the probability that the event
will occur, a factfinder will need to look to indicia of interest
in the transaction at the highest corporate levels. Without
attempting to catalog all such possible factors, we note by
way of example that board resolutions, instructions to
investment bankers, and actual negotiations between
principals or their intermediaries may serve as indicia of
interest.. . . No particular event or factor short of closing the
transaction need be either necessary or sufficient by itself to
render merger discussions material.so
Under German law, the application of the materiality standard in the
merger context is more rigid and favorable to the defendants. A merger
need not be disclosed until a company's board (the German supervisory
board or Aufsichtsrat) has adopted an agreement-in-principle. 3 5 1 This
contrasts with the U.S. probability/magnitude standard, which does not
require that an agreement-in-principle be executed.352 According to the
German agreement-in-principle standard, and based on the facts already
3
'6Id. at 100.
3 Id at 103-04.
4Id at 97-98.
' See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 (1988) ("Whether merger discussions in any
particular case are material therefore depends on the facts."); see also Consolidated Amended Class
Action Complaint, supra note I (demanding ajury trial).
310 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 239.
3' Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16, 2012, at 88.
352 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238.
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discussed, the German court thus found that the June 17 prospectus was
not materially false or misleading because the supervisory board only
voted to go forward with the merger on July 23, 2000, and no disclosure
was required before this date.353
C. Materiality in the Real Estate Context
Deutsche Telekom's February 21, 2001 write-down of $2 billion to
account for a decline in the value of its real estate assets came after serious
questions about how the company had valued its real estate assets. As
already noted, a German prosecutor in Bonn had already initiated a fraud
investigation into Deutsche Telekom's real estate valuations in June of
2000. The investigation reflected profound concerns on the part of the
former head of the real estate division of Deutsche Telekom, who departed
from Deutsche Telekom because he considered the valuations to be
fraudulent.
In and of itself, however, the February 2001 write-down did not
concede that the real estate valuations had been false or misleading, or that
they were material to investors. The company did not restate its financials,
nor did it file a special 8k disclosure with the SEC. Instead, it merely
reduced the carrying value of its real estate assets on its balance sheet by
reassessing their value in 2001 in light of purportedly changed
circumstances in the real estate markets.354
SEC Staff Bulletin No. 99 sets forth the SEC's interpretation of
materiality for accounting purposes.3 ss It recognizes that accountants make
use of a rule of thumb that a "misstatement or omission of an item that falls
under a 5% threshold is not material in the absence of particularly
egregious circumstances." 356 Deutsche Telekom's real estate write-down
represented less than five percent of the total balance sheet assets of
Deutsche Telekom. So the five percent threshold was not reached.
But the Staff Bulletin rejects any purely quantitative measure of
materiality. Relying on the Financial Accounting Standards Board's
(FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, the Staff
Bulletin concludes that here too the TSC Industries "reasonable investor
standard" applies.3 57 The FASB states:
The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report
is material if, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the
11 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16, 2012, at 87-88.
354 Id. at 115-16.
35 SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, supra note 320.
31 Id. (footnote omitted).
35 Id.
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magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that the
judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report
would have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or
correction of the item.358
Staff Bulletin No. 99 notes that this formulation in the accounting
literature is in substance identical to the "total mix of information"
formulation set forth by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries and in
Basic. 359
Deutsche Telekom's write-down did represent around five percent of
the company's $37.7 billion in shareholder equity. The prospectus reported
that the "book value" and "net carrying amount" of Deutsche Telekom's
real estate assets were 17.2 billion Euros as of March 31, 2000, the first
quarter of 2000.360 According to the prospectus, Deutsche Telekom's real
estate assets thus contributed to a total reported 37.709 billion Euros in
shareholder equity as of March 31, 2000, with total assets for the company
reported at 101.477 billion Euros as of March 31, 2000.361 These facts
might at least have allowed plaintiffs to argue materiality. In addition, the
U.S. plaintiffs could have argued that the valuations were fraudulent and
that the threat of its exposure was material.
As in the merger context, the materiality standard applied to the real
estate valuations by the German court was more rigid and bright-line. The
German court found no mistake in the prospectus. 36 2 The German court
based its decision on the fact that the two billion Euro write-down on
February 21, 2001, constituted only around twelve percent of the total 17.2
billion Euros in Deutsche Telekom's real estate assets, which difference
was well within the legally allowable tolerance of up to plus/minus thirty
percent in the valuation of the real estate assets under German law. 363
The court ruled that any discrepancies were thus immaterial and could
not give rise to liability for a false or misleading prospectus. 3 64 The court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the cluster method of real estate
valuation was improper and therefore misleading and that Deutsche
Telekom's reliance on such method was therefore in and of itself
materially misleading.365
The German court thus ultimately held that the pre-2001 real estate
valuations could not have been fraudulent because they were not
3 Id.
' Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 35-36.
36 DT PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 131, at 27.
362 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16, 2012, at 113.
353 Id. at 118.
3 Id. at 123-25.
365 Id. at 124.
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material.366 In contrast, the U.S. settlement would suggest that defendants
were concerned a jury could find that the pre-2001 valuations were
fraudulent and therefore material. The standard for materiality deployed
by each court was thus also central to the resolution of the real estate
allegations.
VI. ANALYSIS
It is difficult to second-guess the outcome of the Deutsche Telekom
litigation in the United States or in Germany. But we can make some
observations about the process.
The U.S. litigation proceeded in a timely and organized fashion as the
case went to discovery rapidly. Discovery took just under two years,
concluding in December of 2003, and the parties reached a settlement
within five years of the filing of the complaints. 36 7 The U.S. litigation thus
proceeded fairly rapidly in comparison to the German litigation.
By contrast, the German litigation took eleven years, more than twice
as long, to generate a decision on the merits in 2012.368 The 2012 decision
in the Model Proceeding resolved the VoiceStream issues, but the plaintiffs
appealed the Higher Regional Court's decision on the real estate valuation
and on certain accounting practices related to Deutsche Telekom's sale of
shares in Sprint, to the Federal Supreme Court.369 On October 12, 2014, the
Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) issued its opinion affirming
the court below on the real estate claims, but holding that the prospectus
did not properly value the sale of the Sprint shares to its own subsidiary. 3 70
The time it takes to finally resolve the German litigation thus may well
turn out to be fifteen years-three times as long as it took in the United
States.37'
' Id. at 115 ("For the aforementioned reasons, the disclosure of [DT's] real estate valuation can
only be erroneous, i.e. constitute a mistake in the prospectus, if the value exceeds the permissible
tolerances [that legally apply to real estate valuation]."). The German court repeatedly insists that the
aggregate-or "cluster"-method of valuation was permissible. Id. at 119, 124, 125. But its reasoning
seems to be results-based, i.e., that the cluster method was permissible, because it arrived at a number
that was within the acceptable margin of error.
367 Docket, supra note 187.
3 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/Main [OLG Frankfurt/Main] [Higher Regional Court Frankfurt],
May 16,2012,23 Kap 1/06.
" Plaintiff-side attorney Andreas Tilp explained that the VoiceStream decision was not appealed
because the plaintiffs did not believe they had a strong case and lacked sufficient evidence to go
forward on the issue. Interview with Andreas Tilp, supra note 235.
3' Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Beschluss vom 21 Oct. 2014, Az. XI ZB
12/12.
"' See, for example, remarks by plaintiff-side attorney Andreas Tilp in Andreas Toiler, Ich
Empfehle der Telekom Einen Gesamtvergleich, WIRTSCHAFTS WocHE (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://www.wiwo.de/finanzen/steuem-recht/anlegeranwalt-andreas-tilp-ich-empfehle-der-telekom-eine
n-gesamtvcrgleich/11140966.html [https://perma.cc/GQ9U-ZYCH]. Indeed, in 2004, the Frankfurt
Regional Court Judge who presided over the Deutsche Telekom litigation, Meinrad Woesthoff,
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The Telekom example supports the conclusion that the U.S. system has
an advantage in civil procedure in the kind of private enforcement that
Europe is now seeking to introduce. The fact that the U.S. litigation was a
relatively simple, straightforward securities class action only underscores
the point that the German system is unable to handle "Big Cases."
One might counter that the German litigation went to trial, was
subsequently appealed, and therefore had to go through many more stages
than the U.S. litigation. But, by the time the German courts began to hear
the first witnesses in 2008, the U.S. litigation had long been concluded.372
Resolving motions for summary judgment in New York, which were
drafted by the parties in early 2004,373 might have taken a year, and a trial
might have taken another year. But even so, the U.S. case would likely
have been tried, if not appealed, by 2006, whereas the German trial only
began in 2008.374
But, comparing the timelines in this manner ignores that the very
purpose of U.S. litigation discovery is to encourage settlements before trial
by eliminating information asymmetries between the parties and bringing
them closer in their respective assessments of the value of a case and the
risk of going to trial.375 Indeed almost all securities class actions are settled
before trial. The development of the U.S. Deutsche Telekom litigation is
thus the norm, rather than an outlier, and reflects fundamental choices
about the design of the litigation process.
One of the choices made by the German (and Civil Law) system is to
make appeals on both the law and the facts readily available, which helps
expedite litigation at the trial court level, but also encourages appeals. 3 76
"Indeed," writes John Reitz, "the entire proof process is so economical that
the first level of appeal in German courts is de novo and routinely includes
rehearing of witnesses with regard to the crucial factual issues still in
dispute." 377 But in complex cases, a system that is not successful at
encouraging settlements (German procedure does indeed try to encourage
estimated that it would take fifteen years to work through the Deutsche Telekom litigation. Daniel
Schonwitz et al., Die T-Aktie Vor Gericht, WIRTScHAFrS WOCHE (Apr. 8, 2008),
http://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen/telekom-prozess-die-t-aktie-vor-gericht/5368350.html [https://per
ma.cc/7WH4-KYYJ].
3 Tilp, supra note 16, at 314.
11 Telephone Interview with Robert Wallner, supra note 199.
3 See Docket, supra note 187.
3s See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of
the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 716 (1998).
37 Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context,
53 AM. J. CoMP. L. 709, 720 (2005) (stating that, in Germany, "[aippellate review may occur 'at almost
any stage of the proceedings,' and can involve consideration of facts not brought before the lower
court." (citing MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 367)).
3 John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75
IOWA L. REv. 987, 989 (1990).
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them), may take longer to resolve cases and impose a heavier burden on
judicial resources.38
The KapMuG tries to mitigate the inefficiencies of re-litigating issues
on appeal by making the Higher Regional Court, which usually serves as a
court of appeals, the forum in which common issues of law and fact are
litigated. 37 9 The Lower Regional Court serves instead to prepare the issues,
factual allegations, and offers of proof for adjudication by the Higher
Court.38 0 This means that any appeals from decisions in the Model
Proceeding go straight to the Federal Supreme Court, thus eliminating one
of the stages of appeal.381 The process of preparing and consolidating all
the issues, factual allegations, and proffers of evidence in a brief of issues
to be decided in the Deutsche Telekom model proceeding involved heavy
briefing, hearings, negotiations between the parties, and took at least as
much time as discovery took in the United States.
More important is the question of why the entire proof process is
deemed so "economical" at the trial court level.
One of the main reasons is that the German system, and civil law more
generally, eliminates the phase of discovery, which tends to be the
lengthiest phase of U.S. litigation. 38 2 Instead, the German judge "plays the
central role in building the record"3 83 by reviewing the evidence, asking the
parties to make written submissions to clarify disputed issues of law or
fact, examining witnesses named by the parties, and giving the parties
feedback as to his or her present leanings given any evidence presented.
This may well expedite the resolution of smaller cases, because it
eliminates party-on-party discovery prior to trial, and effectively
consolidates the separate and consecutive information processing tasks of
American litigation into one process in which everything passes through
the judge.3* Making the judge do most of the work, however, clearly
378 See HUANG, supra note 265, at 38-39 ("[M]any more cases are disposed of by a fully
contested judgment in the continental system than in the common law system, despite the fact that the
civil judges tend to push settlement much harder than their common law colleges .... [B]y introducing
discovery, the continental system could both promote settlement and improve the quality of
settlements."); MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 259 ("The German court is statutorily mandated
to encourage voluntary settlement of civil cases at all stages of the proceedings." (citing
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Oct. 10, 2013, § 278, 1 1, translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch zpo/englisch-zpo.html#pl022)).
17' Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets Model Case Act] Aug.
16, 2005, BGBI I at 243, § 11(1), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch kap
mug/index.htmi [https://perma.cc/7BYT-HY6G]; KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 377.
380 KapMuG § 2; KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 135.
381 HALFMEIER ET AL., supra note 279, at 58.
3' Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1391, 1483.
383 Reitz, supra note 377, at 990.
" While German attorneys submit briefs to the court, one of the problems of the German
statutory fee schedule is that it bases its fees on specific actions completed, rather than the time it took
to complete them. MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 112. While this may keep costs low, one of
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imposes a greater burden on judicial resources. The burden on individual
judges may be alleviated by employing more judges, which is what
Germany does, and what, in part, accounts for its efficient court system.385
Nonetheless, in complex cases a single judge (or a panel of judges) may
become overwhelmed.
As the comparative analysis of the Deutsche Telekom case shows, the
American style of separation and specialization of tasks and outsourcing of
discovery to a team of litigation attorneys for each party, is likely to lead to
a far speedier resolution of disputes. Such a style may even be necessary to
process the large amounts of information required to investigate
wrongdoing by large organizations with tens of thousands of employees,
thousands of offices and properties, and a global footprint like Deutsche
Telekom. Large projects require specialization and teamwork, which also
renders them more efficient.
One might object that the German Deutsche Telekom litigation cannot
serve as a measure of KapMuG's efficiency, because it was the "test case"
for a procedural innovation that was being invented as the case went along.
Under this view, it should have been expected that the. litigation would take
less time than usual and that the efficiency of such proceedings would
increase as judges and attorneys gained experience with the new process.
But so far, the evidence on this point is mixed. A 2009 study evaluating
KapMuG for the German Federal Justice Department
(Bundesjustizministerium), concluded that most of those surveyed about
the KapMuG-which by then had been employed in twenty-four
cases38 6 -doubted that the KapMuG resulted in a speedier litigation
process, or, if it did, the improvement was negligible. 38 7 The KapMuG was
reauthorized and amended in 2012,388 in part to increase the speed and
the consequences is that attorney work product is often inferior, and judges are in the position of having
to help attorneys who are not sufficiently prepared to satisfy their obligations to their clients. Id. at 115.
It is part of the role of the judge, as a neutral arbiter, to ensure that the parties receive a fair hearing.
Thus, unlike in the United States, where a party loses its rights if it does not assert them, the German
judge will assist a party's attorney in making sure that the party takes advantage of all of its procedural
rights.
385 Id. at 52-53.
36 HALFMEIER ET AL., supra note 279, at 50-52. Note that although there were twenty-four
separate cases, many of them were related cases with the same parties. In other words, KapMuG
proceedings were brought against only ten issuers, but challenged separate securities issuances by the
same issuer. Id Note that although there were twenty-four separate cases, many of them were related
cases with the same parties. In other words, KapMuG proceedings were only brought against ten
issuers, but challenged separate securities issuances by the same issuer.
" Id at 57. But see KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 59, for Hess's suggestion that at
least the first phase of the 2006 case Gelt v. DainilerChrysler was handled more expeditiously.
" Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMug] [Capital Markets Model Proceedings Act]
Oct. 19, 2012, BGBI 1at 2182.
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efficiency of the process.3 89 At this point, we do not know what the results
will be. But from the authorization, it is clear that German lawmakers
remain committed to developing private enforcement of securities-
disclosure violations."*
The difference between American litigation discovery and German fact
acquisition is not merely that more resources are dedicated to the process
in the United States and that a civil law judge does what the attorneys for
the parties do in the United States. Rather, there is neither discovery, nor
any functional equivalent of discovery, in civil law systems like Germany.
The principle of party presentation and other fundamental principles of
civil law prevent both the parties and the judge from engaging in probing
fact investigation, let alone conducting the broad and intrusive type of
discovery that characterizes American civil litigation.39 '
Recall that most of the documents obtained by the parties in the
German litigation came from the prosecutor in Bonn and were not
developed during the litigation.392 Moreover, the plaintiffs were able to
obtain the detailed information about the VoiceStream acquisition only
because the plaintiffs already knew that deposition transcripts concerning
the VoiceStream acquisition were in the possession of the defendants
together with the attached exhibits. Thus, access to this critical information
was possible only because it had already been developed in other
proceedings. However, it is impossible to know what other information
was generated and might have influenced the American settlement,
because the American settlement and discovery were subject to a
confidentiality agreement.393 It is possible, for example, that the U.S.
plaintiffs' attorneys strategically withheld some of the most important
documents from the witnesses during depositions in order to use them
more effectively at summary judgment-which became the basis for the
settlement negotiations-or at trial.394
3 See KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 11, at 34. Settlement was also facilitated by eliminating
the requirement that all claimants must agree before a settlement becomes valid. Id. at 33. Presumably
these changes could substantially expedite the resolution of KapMuG proceedings.
" Lawmakers, however, explicitly declined to extend the Model Proceeding mechanism to other
types of mass claims. Fabian Reuschle, Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz-Eine Erste
Bestandsaufnahme aus Sicht der Praxis, in EUROPAISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE, supra note 13, at 277, 278.
39 Whereas judges in Germany do have the authority to seek additional information from the
parties on their own initiative, this authority is quite limited, and very rarely exercised. See HUANG,
supra note 265, at 21-22 (explaining that the principle of party presentation does not allow the judge to
engage in fact-finding investigations); MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 263 ("If the court deems
some fact not advanced by one or the other party to be potentially relevant, the court may call this
potential fact to the attention of the parties and invite them to comment on it or incorporate it in their
positions."). The judges in the Deutsche Telekom litigation did not exercise this authority. Interview
with Andreas Tilp, supra note 235.
" Interview with Andreas Tilp, supra note 235.
393 See Docket, supra note 187.
3 I want to thank my colleague Christine Bartholomew for pointing out this possibility.
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This raises the question whether the German civil law process gives
plaintiffs a fair chance at building their case. Can KapMuG's variant on
representative litigation encourage private enforcement without also
introducing forms of discovery into civil law that would give plaintiffs or
courts tools to engage in intrusive corporate internal investigations? 395
There have been almost no big cases like the Deutsche Telekom
litigation in the German courts. This was, in part, attributable to German
substantive securities laws, which the government has been amending to
strengthen confidence in the markets.9 But the longtime lack of
provisions in German substantive law that would enable private
enforcement can also be seen as a reflection of a civil procedure system
unable to handle such claims. 3 97 As Murray and Stilrner note:
Of course in any system there will always be cases which
turn on very fine distinctions of fact. The contention [here] is,
however, that in common law systems there are likely to be
more such cases than in civil law systems. The Federal
Rules' broad pre-trial discovery can be seen as a direct
consequence of this basic distinction.9
In other words, procedure enables and constrains substantive law.39
The lack of discovery helps explain why German prospectus liability
makes the question of recklessness or intent an affirmative defense:
without discovery, it is impossible for a plaintiff to prove recklessness or
' See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1423-24, 1426, 1440-42 (explaining that
because extensive discovery requires outside counsel to conduct thorough investigations into a
company's internal affairs, attorneys are in the position to uncover internal misconduct, which they are
then required to disclose under legal ethics rules).
39 Thus, for example, unlike in the United States, Germany has no "fraud on the market theory"
which serves as a presumption that investors relied on statements made in an issuer's prospectus.
ASSMANN & SCHOTZE, supra note 40, § 1 (describing the transformation of German capital markets
regulation since the 1990s).
3 See MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 22, at 592 ("[A]lthough facts always play a role in the
resolution of legal disputes, under some systems they may tend to be of somewhat greater importance
than under others. In the present context, it has been argued that fact finding and fact distinctions tend
to be of somewhat greater importance in a common law system such as that of the United States than in
a civil law system such as that of Germany.").
" Id at 592-93 n.65; see also Rolf Sttmer, Transnational Civil Procedure: Discovery and
Sanctions Against Non-Compliance, 6 UNIFoRM L. REV. 871, 871-72 (2001) (explaining basic
procedural structures of American litigation).
" For example, changes in civil procedure in the United States, which led to an increasingly
liberal discovery regime, are credited with influencing American substantive law in many different
fields. See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 818 (1981) (demonstrating that procedural
rules governing the scope of discovery in civil cases resulted in developments in areas such as product
liability, employment discrimination, and consumer protection); Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at
1455 (demonstrating the effect of discovery as a key driver of legal change in the area of fiduciary
duties in corporate law).
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intent on the part of the defendant. Recognizing the problem of proof
facing plaintiffs, German lawmakers employ the device of burden-
shifting. 40 0
But burden-shifting may not be sufficient to afford plaintiffs a fair
chance because it still does not require a defendant to produce all relevant
information bearing on the question of recklessness or intent. The
information, to the extent that the defendant chooses to reveal it,
necessarily remains one-sided. Moreover, there is no sanction for failing to
reveal information in a civil trial, besides the possibility of losing the case.
This means that there is no incentive to produce detrimental information
that might cause a party to lose.
In the United States, a party that refuses to disclose damaging
information may be held in contempt of court, an attorney may be
sanctioned or even disbarred, and the attorney's law firm may be
sanctioned as well, even if it had no knowledge of the withheld
information.4 01 Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes additional
affirmative duties on attorneys not to engage in disclosure violations.402
Just like the burden-shifting mechanism-which is frequently written
into German substantive law to address the lack of a procedural
mechanism for obtaining relevant information from an opponent--other
aspects of German substantive law may reflect the absence of tools for
adequate fact investigation. The German reliance on "objective standards"
of materiality in the merger context (requiring a vote by the board) and in
the balance sheet valuation process (ignoring intent to manipulate the
balance sheet in favor of a bright-line rule based on percentages) might be
explained by the fact that these threshold requirements can be more readily
4 Dirk Verse, for example, writes that
As the plaintiffs usually have little information about internal processes and
decisions within the issuer, it may sometimes be difficult for them to substantiate
their claims. . . . German law partly meets this concern by reversing the burden of
proof for some central elements of the claim, particularly with respect to the issue of
fault, and in the case of prospectus liability with regard to causation. What is more,
even with respect to those elements of the claim where the burden of proof remains
with the plaintiff, the courts are prepared to alleviate that burden in certain
circumstances. Thus, if the fact to be proved by the plaintiff belongs to the internal
sphere of the issuer and the plaintiff submits the most concrete allegations his
reasonable best efforts can obtain, it is up to the defendant issuer to specify why he
thinks the allegations are unfounded (i.e. the defendant cannot simply deny the
alleged fact).
Verse, supra note 40, at 451-52 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
" See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. ll(b)(4), (c)(1) (providing for sanctions to be imposed against an
attorney who fails to either substantiate or demonstrate a lack of information when denying a factual
contention).
15 U.S.C. § 7245(1) (2012).
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identified and measured without discovery about corporate internal
communications.
But what about the costs of discovery? Is the German system less
costly because it insufficiently investigates facts? Or, conversely, is
American litigation too expensive and a waste of resources?
Critics of the American litigation process complain that "discovery has
become the focus of litigation, rather than a mere step in the adjudication
process . . . . [and] the effort and expense associated with electronic
discovery are so excessive that settlement is often the most fiscally prudent
course-regardless of the merits of the case."4 03 But in the Deutsche
Telekom litigation in the United States, the defendants settled only after
discovery was concluded, meaning that the purpose of the settlement could
not have been to avoid discovery costs.40 The defendants had already
spent all they would on discovery, and assumed these costs when a
settlement was reached. Therefore, the claim that discovery costs are used
to threaten companies to settle remains unsupported by this litigation.
Attorneys in Germany have speculated that there were other motives
behind the settlement in the American litigation-namely to ensure that
evidence of wrongdoing on the part of Deutsche Telekom's management
would remain confidential and would not be available for use in the
German litigation.4 0 5 They point to the fact that the German government
vehemently opposed the plaintiffs' request under 28 U.S.C. § 1798 to gain
access to the discovery in the New York litigation.406 But it seems unlikely
that the threat of civil liability in Germany would have been the decisive
factor in choosing to settle the case in the United States, given the much
less plaintiff-friendly substantive law in Germany. A more likely
consideration would have been the desire to avoid the spectacle of a trial in
New York that would have forced Deutsche Telekom's former
management to take the stand.407 Because the American case settled and
discovery was conducted subject to a confidentiality agreement, it is
difficult to ascertain the likelihood of the plaintiffs' success on the merits.
But the large settlement amount suggests that there was a significant risk of
liability for Deutsche Telekom if the case had gone to ajury.
The empirical literature shows remarkable consistency over time about
the use and costs of discovery. Discovery costs are related to the stakes of
the litigation. Reports by the Federal Judicial Center in the United States
4 BEISNER, supra note 54, at 2.
' See Docket, supra note 187 (displaying the parties' completion of discovery prior to
settlement).
' Interview with Andreas Tilp, supra note 235.
4 Id.
' Sommer left Deutsche Telekom in 2002.
870 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:817
THE AMERICAN ADVANTAGE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE?
have shown that median discovery costs represent around 3.3% of the
value of a case.408 In larger cases, discovery costs are often higher.
Here, the plaintiffs received a total of $1.44 million in fees and
expenses, which amounted to approximately 1.2% of the $120 million
recovery. 4 09 If 90% of that is attributable to discovery, then the plaintiffs'
discovery costs represented less than 1.1% of the value of the settlement.
But Deutsche Telekom claimed that its litigation costs in the United States
amounted to 17 million Euros (around $20 million at the 2004-2005
exchange rate).410 Total discovery costs were therefore more than 10% of
the settlement value, although perhaps less than that if we consider the
plaintiffs' original claims. These costs were certainly substantial. But
litigation costs in the German KapMuG litigation were also high. At one
point, the German court contemplated ordering an independent expert
opinion on the value of Deutsche Telekom's real estate assets. The expert
opinion was estimated to cost between 20 and 70 million Euros, but the
plaintiffs balked, and the court thus avoided ordering the report.4 11
As I have argued (with Erica Gorga), however, the cost/benefit
analysis of discovery should not be calculated based on the value of the
412dispute in a single case. There are private benefits that stem from
discovery for a defendant corporation by way of corporate governance
improvements that result from such corporate internal investigations.4 13
And there are social benefits of discovery that go beyond these private
benefits. 414 As Gorga and I have argued, it is precisely this ability to obtain
detailed information about corporate internal practices and procedures
relating to specific transactions and events throughout the entire corporate
hierarchy, that makes discovery so important to promoting good corporate
governance. 4 15 Indeed, German lawmakers are trying to make cases like the
Deutsche Telekom litigation possible in Germany, not merely, or even
primarily, to compensate investors for losses, but because of their larger
40 LEE & WILLGING, supra note 82, at 42.
' In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., No. 00-CV-9475 (NRB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45798, at *8, *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2005).
410 See Oberlandesgericht [OLG Koln] [Higher Regional Court] May 28, 2009, 18 URTEIL
108/07, 2 (Ger.), translation at http://openjur.de/u/30969.print [https://perma.cc/JP5G-KV6X] (noting
that Deutsche Telekom's claimed costs are disputed).
4.. HALFMEIER ET AL., supra note 279, at 55. Verse writes that the KapMuG saves judicial
resources and litigation costs, "mainly because costly expert evidence will be required only once in the
model case proceedings." Verse, supra note 40, at 451.
412 See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1477-79 (arguing instead that when analyzing the
efficiency of discovery, the aggregate benefits should also be considered).
43 id.
414 Id. at 1479.
41s Id. at 1478-79.
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social benefits in promoting strong securities markets.4 16 Thus, the private
costs of discovery must be considered along with both the private and
social benefits of greater transparency and deterrence that private
enforcement brings.
VII. CONCLUSION
The aim of this Article has been to examine the influence of civil
procedure on the legal framework that supports securities markets in the
United States and in Germany, in light of the considerable convergence of
German and European securities regulation on the American model of
securities disclosure regulation. The Article has shown just how different
the development and outcome of the Deutsche Telekom litigation has been
in the United States and in Germany, in spite of the relatively similar
standards of substantive law under which the cases were decided. Even as
Germany has implemented a new aggregate litigation mechanism to enable
investors to vindicate their right to obtain accurate securities disclosures,
the process is neither efficient, nor does it deal with the critical question of
how plaintiffs are to investigate issuer misconduct without anything like
the tools of modern American litigation discovery.
Conversely, current debates about American litigation discovery in
commercial and securities litigation have focused almost exclusively on
the purportedly excessive cost and burdens of U.S. discovery. But the
consequences of procedural rules in European and other civil law
jurisdictions like Germany, which prohibit discovery, have rarely been
considered by such critics. This comparative case study contributes to the
scholarship both by highlighting important differences and developments
in German law from the perspective of an American attorney and drawing
certain conclusions along the way, and also by highlighting those questions
that remain unanswered and require substantial additional research.
416 KOLNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 1I, at 29; HALFMEIER ET AL., supra note 279, at 85
(describing the goals of the KapMuG statute to include enforcing capital markets regulation and
enhancing the attractiveness of Germany's securities markets and as a forum for the adjudication of
civil disputes).
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